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This issue brings our annual review of recent criminal decisions of theUnited States Supreme Court. We’re in a time of transition there. Afterdoing the summaries for us for the past decade, Berkeley Law Prof. Chuck
Weisselberg let us know that he would need to prioritize other projects going
forward. Starting next year, we’ve signed up Michigan Law Prof. Eve Brensike
Primus to take over the task. We’re excited to have her; she is a coauthor for
one of the leading criminal-procedure casebooks. But we were too late in ask-
ing to get her on board for this year.
Fortunately, Chuck Weisselberg was able to suggest someone who could
provide an excellent review of the recent cases for us this year—Juliana
DeVries, who works full-time as a federal appellate defender and who formerly
served as a law clerk on the Ninth Circuit. She’s on top of these cases as part of
her work, and she has done a great job of covering the cases of most interest to
state-court judges. She also highlights the key cases on tap for the current Term.
We’re pleased that Canadian judge Wayne
Gorman, who writes a regular column for us
on Canadian law, has expanded his submission
for this issue to provide a parallel review of
recent criminal decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada.
The remainder of our issue covers several
different topics of interest to judges:
• Prof. Sara Warf teaches legal writing at the
University of North Carolina law school,
and one of her courses prepares students for
judicial clerkships. In working with current
and former UNC law students, she has
found that common problems can arise
when students start writing for judges. She
gives five tips for how judges can best train new law clerks to write for us.
• Prof. Joseph Hamm works on issues of public trust in courts, law enforce-
ment, and other governmental entities. He tells us about the expanding view
academics have about what goes into creating greater public trust, as well as
what that might mean for judges in their daily work.
• Cynthia Gray, director of the Center for Judicial Ethics, writes for us now
twice a year on current judicial-ethics topics. In this issue, she explains how
the use of a judicial ethics advisory committee may keep you out of trouble.
And she summarizes recent advisory opinions from around the United States
that may be of interest.
• Attorney and former judicial law clerk Jaime Santos helped found a group
(Law Clerks for Workplace Accountability) and testified before the United
States Senate Judiciary Committee on recent issues involving sexual harass-
ment of court staff. We asked her to write an essay for us that would famil-
iarize judges with the issues being raised, suggest some possible steps to
address those issues, and provide links to additional resources for those who
would like to go further.
As always, we hope you enjoy the issue. If you have comments or sugges-
tions, please write to Editors@CourtReview.org—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unso-
licited, original articles, essays, and book reviews. Court
Review seeks to provide practical, useful information to
the working judges of the United States and Canada. In
each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to be encountered by
many judges, or by providing background information
(such as psychology or other social science research)
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Hafa adai (greetings) colleagues and Court Review readers!
In this column, we celebrate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
who was the first woman to serve on the United States Supreme
Court after President Ronald Reagan nominated her in 1981.
Often inhabiting the ideological center, O’Connor cast pivotal
votes on controversial issues, was referred to in a 2001 New
York Times article by Jeffrey Rosen “as the most powerful
woman in America,” and was awarded the highest civilian
honor in the United States, the Presidential Medal of Freedom,
by President Barack Obama in 2009. Sandra Day O’Connor,
according to Chief Justice John Roberts, is “a tow-
ering figure in the history of the United States and
indeed the world [and] is a role model not only
for girls and women but for all those committed
to equal justice under law.” 
Last fall, in a letter released by the Supreme
Court’s public information office, Justice O’Con-
nor revealed that she was stepping away from the
public life because she is at the beginning stages
of dementia. Instead of simply disclosing her
decision, she used the occasion to urge citizens to
increase their commitment to civics education—a cause in
which she strongly believes and has spent numerous years and
unwavering energy to promote and sustain. In her letter, she
explained how she saw firsthand the need for citizens to under-
stand the Constitution and the nation’s unique system of gov-
ernment because together, we can work within our communi-
ties to solve problems, learn from what has served us best over
time, and work for the common good to hold our governmen-
tal institutions accountable. 
Justice O’Connor founded iCivics, an online educational
classroom that reimagines civics to cultivate a new generation
of students for thoughtful and active citizenship. Aimed to
expand the reach of civics education to every student in Amer-
ica by 2021, iCivics helps young people to “grow more
informed, more curious, and more engaged in civic life.” Jus-
tice O’Connor believes that “the practice of democracy is not
passed down through the gene pool. It must be taught and
learned anew by each generation of citizens.” More information
about iCivics can be found at https://www.icivics.org/.
Inspired by Justice O’Connor, more than a decade ago I ini-
tiated a program at the Judiciary of Guam centered around Law
Day to promote a better understanding of law and civics. We
engage students and the public through thought-provoking
resources and learning experiences to broaden understanding
of law and government. The program has been nationally rec-
ognized by the American Bar Association with the Law Day
Outstanding Activity Award in 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2016,
and 2018. This program has seen enormous success in partici-
pation from the elementary school level all the way up to high
school, and it continues to help students become effective citi-
zens and leaders.
In line with Justice O’Connor’s mission to cre-
ate a nationwide civics education program, I urge
each of you to make a commitment to civic learn-
ing and civic engagement. A mission of the
American Judges Association is to “provide a
forum for the continuing education of its mem-
bers and the general public.” As judicial officers,
we can honor Justice O’Connor’s lifelong mission
to champion civics education within our own
communities by creating and encouraging pro-
grams like iCivics. As Justice O’ Connor aptly stated, “If we
want our democracy to thrive, we must commit to educating
our youth about civics and to helping young people understand
their crucial role as informed, active citizens in their commu-
nities and in our nation.” She challenges each of us to do some-
thing—do something in our communities to capture the inter-
est of our youth and to help them learn about and appreciate
civics and how our laws and government work. There are
important lessons that we can learn as a community through
increased civics education, and we can honor Justice O’Con-
nor’s vision by educating future generations of students to be
active participants in their communities. Justice O’Connor
believes that “civic knowledge is a prerequisite for civic partic-
ipation,” and with increased civic participation, our communi-
ties can be more informed, thrive for the good of all, and work
toward a better world for this and future generations. 
Among all her accomplishments, Justice O’ Connor consid-
ered engaging the next generations of citizens to be her most
important work and her legacy. Let us honor her by inspiring
kids to want to stay involved in making a difference.
Robert J. Torres, Jr.
President’s Column
Footnotes
1. In re Steigman (Illinois Courts Commission August 13, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9u3gkxt.
2. Center for Judicial Ethics, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees by
State, available at https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Top-
ics/Center%20for%20Judicial%20Ethics/JudicialEthicsAdviso-
ryCommitteesbyState.ashx. 
3. Center for Judicial Ethics, Links to State Advisory Committees,
available at https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/
Ethics/State-Links.aspx?cat=Ethics%20Advisory%20Committees. 
4. See California Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Oral
Advice Summaries, available at http://judicial
ethicsopinions.ca.gov/oral-advice-summaries/.
5. A town justice, on behalf of the justice court, may accept a $1,000
testamentary bequest approved by the surrogate’s court to hold a
holiday party at the courthouse and may invite lawyers by posting
notices with the bar association and/or at the courthouse. New
York Advisory Opinion 2018-124, available at
(http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/18-124.htm). 
6. See, e.g., Florida Advisory Opinion 2018-13 (a judge married to a
public defender who supervises the public defenders assigned to
diversion courts may not preside over cases in which her spouse
is the attorney of record or cases that her spouse supervises but
may preside over other criminal cases, may refer cases to a diver-
sionary court presided over by another judge, and may accept
cases returned to the trial division from a diversionary court),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPrac-
tice/opinions/jeacopinions/2018/2018-13.html.
7. New York Advisory Opinion 2018-44(A) (a judge is not disquali-
fied from matters involving a credit union where he is a member
and account holder), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judi-
cialethics/opinions/18-44(A).htm.
8. South Carolina Advisory Opinion 2-2018 (a county magistrate
who has just began dating the county sheriff shall disqualify him-
self from any matters in which employees of the sheriff appear as
witnesses), available at http://www.sccourts.org/advisoryOpin-
ions/html/02-2018.pdf. 
Recently, in publicly reprimanding an appellate judge forusing his judicial position to solicit paid speakingengagements, the Illinois Courts Commission stated that
it was “frankly puzzled” that the judge had not sought guid-
ance from “the excellent advisory opinions produced by the
Illinois Judges Association’s committee on judicial ethics,” as
well as the Commission’s prior decisions.1 That case is a
reminder to judges of the assistance available if they ask before
they act.
Approximately 45 states, the District of Columbia, and the
United States Judicial Conference have judicial ethics advisory
committees to which judges can submit inquiries regarding the
propriety of contemplated future action under the code of judi-
cial conduct.  The Center for Judicial Ethics website has a table
with information on each committee2 and links to advisory
committee websites.3
Most committees post their opinions online, and some of
the sites are searchable and have topic indices.  Some commit-
tees, however, do not have a website, and others seem inactive
as they have not posted an opinion in years.  Perhaps those
committees are relying on oral advice to respond quickly.  But
even a rapid answer can be later memorialized in writing and
published to assist more judges, as some committees do.4
Occasionally, a judge may be faced with a unique issue.
(For example, probably few courts have had any reason to ask
whether to accept a $1,000 bequest to fund a holiday party.5)
However, most inquiries are about common quandaries, and
opinions announce general rules that can be applied to specific
situations.  An advisory committee is not doing the best it can
for the state’s judges if it is not routinely making its guidance
available online, where most people turn automatically for
answers.  Further, as an online resource, advisory opinions can
be used to train new judges and provide a refresher course for
more experienced judges.  Finally, by posting opinions online,
advisory committees advance the national conversation on
judicial ethics.
In 2017, judicial ethics committees posted more than 325
advisory opinions online.  Areas in which advice was fre-
quently sought and obtained include acting as a reference;
court staff issues; financial activities; the conduct of senior or
part-time judges; teaching, writing, and speaking; and political
and campaign conduct.
Not surprisingly, disqualification and disclosure are the most
common subjects for inquiries as judges must consider in every
case whether a past or present relationship, interest, or other cir-
cumstance raises reasonable questions about judicial impartial-
ity, and a judge trying to apply that objective standard benefits
from the advice of experienced colleagues.  Committees will not
necessarily rule whether a judge is disqualified from a specific
case but will answer general questions about anticipated con-
flicts, such as, is a judge married to a public defender disquali-
fied from cases in which other public defenders appear?6 Or can
a judge hear matters involving a credit union where he holds an
account?7 Or is a county magistrate who is dating the county
sheriff disqualified from matters in which the sheriff’s employees
appear as witnesses?8 Or is a judge required to disclose that a
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9. Massachusetts Letter Opinion 2018-3 when a judge knows that a
lawyer is a former Facebook friend, disclosure is not presump-
tively required, but the judge should consider whether disclosure
is warranted based on relevant factors), available at
https://www.mass.gov/opinion/cje-opinion-no-2018-03.
10. South Carolina Opinion 13-2018, available at
https://www.sccourts.org/advisoryOpinions/html/13-2018.pdf.
11. New York Opinion 2018-101, available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/18-101.htm.
12. New Mexico Advisory Opinion 2017-7, available at
http://jec.unm.edu/manuals-resources/advisory-opinions/Advi-
sory_Opinion_17-07.pdf.
13. Arizona Advisory Opinion 2018-3, available at
http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/137/ethics%20opinion%2018-
03.pdf.
14. New York Advisory Opinion 2018-8, available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/18-08.htm.
15. California Advisory Opinion 75 (2018), available at
https://www.caljudges.org/docs/Ethics%20Opinions/Op%2075%2
0Final.pdf.
16. South Carolina Opinion 12-2018, available at
https://www.sccourts.org/advisoryOpinions/html/12-2018.pdf.
17. Florida Advisory Opinion 2018-29, available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jea
copinions/2018/2018-29.html.
18. Connecticut Informal Opinion 2018-5, available at
http://jud.ct.gov/Committees/ethics/sum/2018-05.pdf.
19. New York Opinion 2018-100, available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/18-100.htm.
20. Nebraska Advisory Opinion 2015-1, available at  https://supreme-
court.nebraska.gov/sites/supremecourt.ne.gov/files/ethics/judges/
15-1.pdf.
21. Arizona Advisory Opinion 2015-1, available at
(http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/137/ethics_opinions/2015/Revis
edAdvisoryOpinion15-01.pdf); Louisiana Advisory Opinion 263
(2015); New York Advisory Opinion 2011-87, available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/11-87.htm;
Ohio Advisory Opinion 2015-1, available at
http://www.sc.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2015/Op
_15-001.pdf; Wisconsin Advisory Opinion 2015-1, available at
http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?con-
tent=pdf&seqNo=146878.
22. Colorado Advisory Opinion 2014-1, available at
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/01st
_Judicial_District/Pro_Se_Divorce_Information/2014-01.pdf.
23. Alaska Opinion 2018-1, available at http://www.acjc.alaska.gov/
advopinions.html#2018-01.
24. See, e.g., Arizona Advisory Opinion 2014-1, available at
http://www.azcourts.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zNRP1_l8sck
%3d&portalid=137; California Judges’ Association Advisory
Opinion 66 (2010), available at http://www.caljudges.org/docs/
Ethics%20Opinions/Op%2066%20Final.pdf; Connecticut Advi-
sory Opinion 2011-14, available at http://jud.ct.gov/Commit-
tees/ethics/sum/2011-14.htm; Massachusetts Letter Opinion
2016-1, available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-
res/ethics-opinions/judicial-ethics-opinions/cje-2016-01.html;
Missouri Advisory Opinion 186 (2015); New Mexico Advisory
Opinion Concerning Social Media (2016), available at
lawyer appearing before her is a former Facebook friend?9
Other recent advisory opinions related to judicial duties
include:
• A magistrate may not hire as constable the son of another
magistrate from the same county.10
• A court website may not include information promoting a
district attorney’s traffic diversion program but may include
a link to the DA’s website as a convenience to defendant
motorists.11
• A court may, with an appropriate disclaimer, allow a non-
profit legal aid program to set up a table outside a court-
room to offer financially eligible parties free legal advice,
pro se pleadings, and, in some cases, representation.12
Judicial robes should be free of adornments.13
• A judge may ask state legislators for financial support for a
problem-solving court that will address mental health
issues.14
• A judge may make a public service television announce-
ment to encourage persons to become foster parents.15
Judges also frequently ask advisory committees for help in
resolving the tension between their desire to remain involved
in their communities and their commitment to the rules that
protect judicial impartiality and prohibit misuse of the prestige
of office.  Recent opinions on those issues have advised:
• A judge may allow his home to be featured in a tour that
raises funds for the symphony provided his title is not used
in publicizing the event.16
• A judge may accept a distinguished alumni award from the
law school where she graduated at a ceremony that raises
funds for scholarships.17
• A judicial officer may serve on the board of the Girl Scouts
of Connecticut.18
• A judge who appoints CASA to provide information on
cases may not serve on CASA’s advisory board.19
Judicial ethics advisory committees also provide guidance
on “hot topics” that reflect changes in society that affect the
judiciary. For example, the Nebraska committee ensured that
all judges in the state were on the same ethical page in 2015
when, just three days after the United States Supreme Court
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, it advised that a judge may not
refuse to perform marriages for same-sex couples based on a
personal or religious belief.20 Other committees concurred,21
and those opinions not only answered the specific question but
explained the governing ethical principles, not just to the
judges, but to the public.  
Similarly, as decriminalization of marijuana use spreads to
more states, judges may wonder whether the new leniency
applies to them.  The answer is “no” according to the Colorado
committee in 201422 and the Alaska committee more
recently,23 both of which advised that, as long as marijuana use
violates federal law, it also violates the code of judicial conduct.
As an example of the useful role advisory opinions can play,
several advisory committees anticipated the problems inherent
in judicial use of social media and issued opinions on numer-
ous issues that also cautioned judges to be extremely careful.24
In fact, given the increasing number of embarrassing headlines
and judicial discipline cases involving Facebook, it is puzzling
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http://jec.unm.edu/manuals-resources/advisory-opinions/Advi-
sory_Opinion_Social_ Media.pdf; Ohio Advisory Opinion 2010-7,
available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advi-
sory_Opinions/2010/default.asp; Utah Informal Advisory Opinion
2012-1, available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/
ethadv/index.asp; U.S. Advisory Opinion 112 (2017), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAnd-
Policies/conduct/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf; ABA Ethics Formal Opinion
462 (2013)., available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/for-
mal_opinion_462.authcheckdam.pdf.
that more committees have not provided comprehensive guid-
ance in an area that is very publicly tripping judges up.
Judicial ethics advisory committees provide a great service
to judges who want to adhere to the highest possible ethical
standards while balancing the competing interests that define
their role as judges.  Judiciaries have a responsibility to sup-
port a committee that is responsive, functional, and visible.
Since October 1990, Cynthia Gray has been
director of the Center for Judicial Ethics, a
national clearinghouse for information about
judicial ethics and discipline that is part of the
National Center for State Courts. (The CJE was
part of the American Judicature Society before
that organization’s October 2014 dissolution.)
She summarizes recent cases and advisory opinions, answers
requests for information about judicial conduct, writes a weekly
blog (at www.ncscjudicialethicsblog.org), writes and edits the
Judicial Conduct Reporter, and organizes the biennial National
College on Judicial Conduct and Ethics. She has made numerous
presentations at judicial-education programs and written numer-
ous articles and publications on judicial-ethics topics. A 1980
graduate of the Northwestern University School of Law, Gray
clerked for Judge Hubert L. Will of the United States District
Court of the Northern District of Illinois for two years and was a
litigation attorney in two private law firms for eight years.
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Footnotes
1. Although women most commonly experience sexual harassment,
men can likewise be the subject of unwanted sexual advances,
sexual assault, and other harassing behavior in the workplace.
Indeed, when men experience harassment, it can be particularly
difficult for them to report it because they fear ridicule and retal-
iation. This essay, however, focuses primarily on women’s experi-
ences with harassment given the greater frequency with which
women experience harassment because of their comparative lesser
power and representation in many professional workplaces,
including judicial employment. And women of color, members of
the LGBT community, women who are disabled, and women from
other historically marginalized groups are particularly vulnerable
to workplace harassment in all of its invidious forms.
2. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Glenn Thrush Is Suspended and Reassigned by
the New York Times, but not Fired, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://wapo.st/2PjROIFc; Ellen Gabler et al., NBC Fires Matt
Lauer, the Face of ‘Today,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2iiK9zQ. 
3. See, e.g., Jonathan Tamari, Rep. Pat Meehan Will Not Seek Reelec-
tion after Sexual Harassment Furor, INQUIRER (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2UoBpXd; John Bresnahan & Heather Cole, Conyers
Scandal Rocks House Democrats, Politico (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://politi.co/2AZGfzA; Rachael Bade, Lawmaker Behind Secret
$84K Sexual Harassment Settlement Unmasked, Politico (Dec. 1,
2017), https://politi.co/2BAgoiC.  
4. See, e.g., Meredith Mandell & Hilary Rosenthal, Proskauer, Law
Firm known for Handling High-profile Sex Harassment Cases, Is
Accused Itself, NBC News (May 15, 2018),
https://nbcnews.to/2KsuN4i. 
5. Katherine Ku, Pressuring Harassers to Quit Can End Up Protecting
Them, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://wapo.st/2B1xOpc; Matt
Zapatosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to Inappro-
priate Behavior, Including Four Who Say He Touched or Kissed
Them, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://wapo.st/2Ef72gQ;
Dahlia Lithwick, He Made Us All Victims and Accomplices, Slate
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://bit.ly/2QDuk5N; Matt Zapatosky, Promi-
nent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual Miscon-
duct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://wapo.st/2Qk8G7u. 
6. Todd Cooper & Joe Duggan, Nebraska Supreme Court Judge
Resigned after Ethics Complaint; Sexual Comments Emerge, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD (Feb. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2G4i2PQ.  
7. Colby Hamilton, Former Law Clerk Claims State Judge Sexually
Harassed Her, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2AVzkcg.   
8. Zach Benoit, Forsyth Judge Accused of Sexual Harassment Plans Res-
ignation Next Year, BILLINGS GAZETTE (May 5, 2015),
https://bit.ly/2EiGmvE. 
9. Rich Cholodofsky, State Agrees to Pay $52,000 in Westmoreland
Sexual Harassment Case, Trib Live (Apr. 24, 2012),
https://bit.ly/2RHqVjF.
10. Tim Potter, Sedgwick County Judge Accused of Sexual Harassment Is
Reassigned, WICHITA EAGLE (May 19, 2014), https://bit.ly/
2QhNjnd; Tim Potter, State Supreme Court Upholds Findings
Against Former Judge, WICHITA EAGLE (April 7, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2QxMvG0. 
11. Greg Moran, State Court Agency Spent $600,000 to Settle Sexual
Harassment Claims Against Judges, Employees, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2018), https://bit.ly/2L02PhD. 
12. The colleagues to which I am referring include Deeva Shah, Sara
McDermott, Kendall Turner, Claire Madill, Priya Srinivasan, and
Laura Ferguson. Earlier this year, we formalized our group and
started an organization, Law Clerks for Workplace Accountability,
whose mission is to ensure that the federal judiciary provides a
safe workplace environment, free of harassment, for all employees
and to assist the judiciary in reaching this goal. We have also
received considerable support and assistance from countless other
women, including Leah Litman, Emily Murphy, Kathy Ku, Dahlia
Lithwick, and Heidi Bond, all of whom bravely came forward pub-
licly about their own experiences with harassment in the judi-
ciary.
As the last 18 months have demonstrated, there is virtu-ally no American workplace where female employeescan rest assured that they can focus their energy on
work without fear that they could be sexually harassed.1 There
is no industry or profession that “knows better,” even though
there are a number of industries and professions that plainly
should know better. 
We have seen public reports of alleged sexual harassment
involving members of the media (by some of the same indi-
viduals who break news about this very topic2), members of
Congress (by individuals tasked with enacting legislative pro-
tections from harassment3), members of the legal profession
(by partners at firms that specialize in harassment investiga-
tions and defense4), and countless other professions. The judi-
ciary, unfortunately, is no different.
The issue of sexual harassment in the judiciary came to
national public attention last year when the former Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Alex Kozinski, was accused of sexual misconduct by
more than a dozen women. The accusers included numerous
former Ninth Circuit law clerks, judicial externs, lawyers, a
former federal judge, and a law professor.5 But while Kozin-
ski’s misconduct is perhaps the most well-publicized, it is far
from the only reported instance of alleged inappropriate sex-
ual behavior within judicial chambers. Recent years have
seen press reports of numerous allegations against state and
federal judges, often accompanied by resignations or settle-
ments of harassment claims, in Nebraska,6 New York,7 Mon-
tana,8 Pennsylvania,9 Kansas,10 and California,11 just to name
a few. 
To be clear, sexual harassment in the judiciary is not limited
to inappropriate behavior by judges. Over the past year that my
colleagues and I12 have been working collaboratively with the
federal judiciary to study and address these issues, we have
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spoken with numerous women who experienced or witnessed
sexually inappropriate treatment by their co-clerks, by other
chambers staff, or by court staff. The issue transcends job title
and jurisdiction, and to find a solution (or at least to make
progress), we must do so as well. 
WHY DOES HARASSMENT OCCUR WITHIN THE 
JUDICIARY?
Individuals who work for the judiciary—and particularly
judges—are vested with the solemn responsibility of ensuring
equal justice under the law for all, including in harassment and
discrimination cases. So why does harassment happen in the
judiciary? 
As it turns out, despite the stringent codes of conduct that
bind judges and judicial employees, employment within the
judiciary (and particularly within judicial chambers) has all of
the hallmarks of a workplace environment that makes harass-
ment more likely, and that makes speaking up against harass-
ment nearly impossible:
• There is a massive power differential between judges and
employees, and a strict hierarchical structure in which
chambers employees have a single supervisor.
• Judicial chambers are almost entirely autonomous, and
chambers employees are often isolated from others for most
or all of the day. As retired federal judge Nancy Gertner
described it, “It is as if each chambers is a fiefdom, with its
own rules and norms.”13
• In many jurisdictions, there is significant turnover in cham-
bers, with new clerks joining every year or two.
• Leadership is frequently male-dominated (certainly in the
federal system, although some states are making significant
inroads in the gender diversity of the bench14).
• Law clerks are typically employed at the beginning of their
career, when they are most vulnerable and the risk of retali-
ation is perhaps most acute. They also reasonably expect and
rely on mentorship by their judge and a supportive commu-
nity of the judge’s law clerk family for their entire career.
• There are unique requirements of confidentiality, a culture of
non-disclosure, and relationships between judges and
employees “mostly built on worshipful silence.”15
• The judiciary generally has a strong desire to avoid any pub-
lic disclosure of wrongdoing in the interests of maintaining
public confidence.
We cannot change the nature or inherent qualities of judicial
employment—nor should we. But what we can change are the
policies that govern employment within the judiciary, the pro-
cedures for reporting misconduct, the training that members of
the judiciary and judicial employees receive about workplace
conduct, and the culture of the
judiciary. And that is what my
colleagues and I have spent the
last year trying to do.
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE LEVELS
Numerous jurisdictions have
begun to examine their own poli-
cies, procedures, and training
programs related to harassment
and workplace misconduct.
At the federal level, the first
jurisdiction to take action was
the District of Utah, in an effort
spearheaded by former Chief
Judge David Nuffer. Judge Nuffer began focusing on this issue
in 2017, even before the public reports of sexual misconduct by
Alex Kozinski. To determine the scope of any harassment con-
cerns faced by employees, he and his staff sent a short survey
to all court employees, including judges, asking about
instances of sexual harassment that they had observed or expe-
rienced. Because of the significant number of responses to the
survey (119 of 200 recipients completed it), Judge Nuffer
engaged a management consultant to provide analysis and rec-
ommendations, and he convened a working group to develop
and implement action items based on those recommendations.
The working group has focused on strengthening the work-
place by, among other things, educating employees on harass-
ment and the consequences for misconduct, nurturing a cul-
ture of psychological and physical safety for all, building trust
and respect, encouraging and promoting more women into
leadership roles, reducing barriers for reporting, and providing
additional training for staff responsible for fielding complaints
and addressing employee disputes.
In 2018, other groups within the federal judiciary began to
study and address these issues. The Federal Judicial Center
(FJC) revamped its training programs and developed new ones,
including computer-based modules for new law clerks to take
before starting their clerkships. The FJC also has conducted
training programs for countless groups of judges. The Chief Jus-
tice of the United States directed the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts to convene a working group to study these issues
and propose recommendations to address deficiencies in the fed-
eral judiciary’s current policies and reporting procedures.16 The
Chief Justice recently highlighted the working group efforts in
his year-end report on the federal judiciary.17 Based on the work-
ing group’s recommendations, the Judicial Conference of the
United States has proposed revisions to the Judicial Code of
Conduct and to the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Dis-
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ability Proceedings.18 And the
Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts has recently hired a Judicial
Integrity Officer, who will be able to
spearhead these efforts on a perma-
nent basis.19
Several of the Circuits, including
the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits, have begun to take action as
well by revising their policies gov-
erning confidentiality, procedures
for reporting misconduct, and train-
ing for new employees and judges.
Three particular innovative devel-
opments to note from these efforts:
First, the Ninth Circuit created a new position called a “Direc-
tor of Workplace Relations,” who will be responsible for the
court’s ongoing effort to prevent and resolve workplace harass-
ment.20 Second, the D.C. Circuit adopted one of the recom-
mendations that my colleagues and I offered by creating a Law
Clerk Advisory Group, an Employee Advisory Group, and an
Employee Sounding Board, which will be able to serve as infor-
mal resources for court employees and provide input to the
D.C. Circuit regarding future recommendations and initiatives.
Third, the D.C. Circuit is also creating programs to protect
employees who come forward to report misconduct by, for
example, providing for a transfer or alternative work arrange-
ment for that employee.21
Finally, California’s State Supreme Court Chief Justice Tani
Cantil-Sakauye recently announced that she has formed a
working group to study and address these issues to ensure that
the court system is safe for all employees.22
Because these developments are new—and many have not
yet been implemented—it is not yet known what impact they
will have on preventing harassment, increasing reporting
when harassment occurs, or changing the culture of the judi-
ciary. But for an institution not historically known for turn-
ing on a dime, the progress that has been made thus far is
impressive. 
By comparison, the United States Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives were unable to muster up enough support for a
modest bill that simply revises Congress’s own sexual harass-
ment policies until nearly a year after legislation was intro-
duced in the House and more than six months after both the
House and the Senate passed different bills to address harass-
ment concerns.23 Given the Senate Judiciary Chairman’s admo-
nitions to the federal judiciary that it was not acting quickly
enough to address harassment concerns and that the judiciary
must “deal with” its harassment “problem . . . or Congress will
have to do it for the courts,” Congress’s extended inability to
take even modest action to address harassment in its own two
houses was bewildering.24
BARRIERS TO PROGRESS
Courts are starting to make progress in addressing harass-
ment concerns, but there is much more work to be done and,
thus far, progress only in particular pockets of the state and
federal judicial system. The reasons for the lack of progress
thus far are many. First, these issues are really, really difficult
to address in any workplace, much less in a workplace that has
the judiciary’s unique characteristics, such as strict confiden-
tiality rules. They give rise to many complicated questions. For
example: Should judges who are informed that their colleagues
may have engaged in misconduct be required to report that
misconduct through official channels (which could chill dis-
closure by employees), or should they have discretion whether
to do so if confidentiality is requested of them (which could
allow misconduct to continue unabated for years)? What types
of concrete actions can be taken to actually prevent retaliation
when an employee is brave enough to come forward to report
misconduct? How can the judiciary structure its avenues for
reporting misconduct to actually encourage reporting despite
the significant power dynamics in play and employees’ fear of
retaliation? Once adequate systems are in place, how does the
judiciary convince employees that it really does want them to
report misconduct?
Second, the working groups tasked with answering these
difficult questions have, for the most part, been composed
almost entirely of judges, who generally lack experience and
expertise crafting these types of policies and procedures and
who have not been on the low end of a significant power dif-
ferential in many, many years. These groups have rarely
brought in experts who do have such expertise or key stake-
holders, such as the law clerks and other lower-level employ-
ees who are most vulnerable to becoming victims of harass-
ment or sexual misconduct. Indeed, some judges have
expressed vehement opposition to stakeholders who are not
judges having any role in these initiatives: one sitting federal
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judge publicly ridiculed the efforts of my colleagues and I as
the “New Spanish Inquisition” and referred to us as “unin-
formed busybodies who should largely be ignored.”25 When
courts have invited the views of experts and stakeholders, they
have done so only at the information-gathering phase and not
when hammering out the details of any proposed changes. And
as we all know, the devil is in the details. 
Third, in many jurisdictions, there is a lack of interest in
addressing this issue, animated by a belief that there is no real
problem—just a couple of bad apples, at most—or that delving
deeply into the issue may reveal information about misconduct
that could reflect poorly upon the institution. At the same
time, courts have largely (with the exception of the District of
Utah and the D.C. Circuit) refused to conduct any compre-
hensive survey of current and former employees to determine
the scope of the problem—a measure that the former Chair of
the EEOC,26 an ethics expert,27 and my colleagues and I have
all argued is essential to effectively tackle the issue. Such a
head-in-the-sand approach not only virtually ensures that
reform measures will be inadequate and ineffective, it also
sends a strong message to employees that the judiciary says it
wants employees to come forward to report misconduct but it
has no actual interest in receiving that information.
Finally, perhaps the most necessary reform that must be
made to have any hope of effectively addressing harassment by
judges is also the most difficult: judges must hold each other
accountable when they become aware of misconduct by their
colleagues. This is an incredibly challenging thing to do. A cul-
ture of autonomy and independence is an integral part of our
judicial system. Moreover, there are power dynamics within the
judiciary—within each courthouse, within each jurisdiction,
and within the judiciary as a whole—that make it daunting for
judges to stand up to each other when they witness or learn
about wrongdoing by their peers. My colleagues and I have
heard time and time again that it is largely a pipe dream to
expect judges to report misconduct by their colleagues—that a
judge cannot realistically be expected to tell another judge how
to run his chambers or treat his employees. But if judges can-
not have the courage to do so, how can they possibly expect
law clerks or other employees to? This culture of autonomy
and independence must yield when it is important enough.
The only question is whether we think a workplace in which
women can focus on work without having to experience or
fear sexual harassment is important enough. 
WHAT YOU CAN DO TO HELP
Because of the autonomy and independence of most cham-
bers, each individual judge has an opportunity to make a sig-
nificant difference in addressing harassment concerns, irre-
spective of any systemic initiatives that may or may not be
underway in your jurisdiction. 
1. Talk about these issues with
your clerks (both men and
women).
It can be awkward to talk about
harassment and other forms of
workplace misconduct. But simply
hoping that these issues will never
arise has not, thus far, turned out to
be an effective way to prevent or
address them. And the more we talk
about these issues, the less awkward
they become. So ask your employ-
ees about their own experiences in
past workplaces—what they’ve
experienced and what they’ve witnessed—and make clear that
your door is always open to talk about any concerns they may
have about harassment or misconduct by any employee or
judge, whether those concerns involve challenges that they are
facing or that others in the courthouse are facing. Having these
conversations will empower the employees you work with and
demonstrate that you are an ally on these issues. 
Even more importantly, you will learn something every time
you have one of these discussions. Many of the judges who
have engaged meaningfully on these issues have done so in
part because they have experienced harassment themselves or
because people they care for or respect have shared their own
personal experiences with harassment; these conversations
have helped them to develop a genuine understanding about
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the long-term negative effects of
harassment—both on individual
victims and on the legal profes-
sion as a whole.
2. See what resources are
available for employees in
your jurisdiction.
Pretend for a moment that you
are an employee who has just
experienced or witnessed harassment by a judge or a supervisor
and you want to come forward to report the incident through
the appropriate channels. Is information about the reporting
avenues easy to find? Can you easily find the relevant policies
that can help you determine whether the conduct you (pretend
to have) experienced is prohibited? Can you tell from the
resources available what an investigation will look like—who
will investigate, who will adjudicate, what your rights will be
during the process, and what remedial relief is available? Would
you be able to find and understand all of this information if you
were a staff member without a college degree? Without a high
school degree? If you had limited English-language abilities? 
If you cannot answer yes to each of these questions, you
probably need to reform the policies and procedures—or at
least explanatory materials—in your jurisdiction. And once
you have done so, with the assistance of local experts in this
area and with the input of key stakeholders (hint: law clerks
and other employees), you will need to train all employees
about the modified policies and procedures. 
3. Learn how to receive complaints about inappropriate
conduct.
Now that you have made clear that your door is open to
employees who want to discuss or report any harassment con-
cerns, it is imperative that you know how to field these ques-
tions and concerns effectively. The way in which a judge
responds to reports of harassment—whether harassment by
another judge or harassment by another employee—can have
an enormous impact on how a victim decides to handle the sit-
uation. If an employee who reports harassment not only
receives empathy, but also is thanked for her bravery in com-
ing forward and is told that she is believed, that she is sup-
ported, that she can receive help in finding counsel, that con-
siderable efforts will be taken to ensure she is not retaliated
against, and that she should continue to come forward with
any concerns, she will be much more likely to feel comfortable
pursuing any reporting avenues. 
Responding to harassment concerns is hardly intuitive. Just
as it requires training to effectively respond to questions dur-
ing oral argument in a way that will actually assist a judge in
coming to the right answer, it likewise requires training to
effectively respond to a complaint about harassment. Ensure
that you have that training or partner with departments or
organizations that can provide it to you.
4. Examine whether your court has studied this issue
recently. 
If it has been some time since your court has examined
issues of harassment or workplace misconduct, establish a
working group to study and address these issues. Partner with
a local university to conduct workplace climate surveys to
determine the scope of any problem. Contact other jurisdic-
tions that have already begun to engage in these efforts to seek
any resources or materials they can provide and any lessons
learned. Invite law clerks and other lower-level employees as
formal members of the group—members who do not simply
provide ad hoc suggestions but who are part of the decision-
making process. Invite respected diversity consultants and
employment lawyers to join.
5. Don’t recreate the wheel.
Develop innovative initiatives while taking advantage of the
important work that others have already done to address harass-
ment and workplace misconduct. Reach out to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, any state agencies that address or
resolve harassment concerns, the Federal Judicial Center, and the
National Center for State Courts to see if they might have
resources that you can adapt to the needs of your court.
6. Publicize your efforts.
If your court undertakes efforts to study and address these
issues, please brag about it—and if you prefer not to do so,
contact Law Clerks for Workplace Accountability and we will
be happy to do it for you. The more that courts study and
address these issues, the more that other courts will be
encouraged to do so. Publicizing your efforts will also
strengthen public confidence in your court and send a strong
message to employees that the court is committed to improve-
ments in this area. 
The legal profession as a whole is doing a fairly abysmal job
of preventing and addressing harassment against women. The
judiciary, however, has the opportunity to set an example for
the rest of the profession about the changes that can be made
when each member is committed to it. The judiciary is the ini-
tial stomping ground for many lawyers—it is where they
received their initial legal training and where they learned how
to treat colleagues and subordinates. 
For first-generation professionals like myself and many of
my Law Clerks for Workplace Accountability colleagues who
did not enter the profession with the connections that are
often the key to success in this field, the opportunity to work
in the judiciary can provide a huge leg up and, indeed, be a
great equalizer. But the converse of this is also true: if the judi-
ciary does not act to prevent harassment, encourage reporting
of harassment, and properly handle harassment complaints
when they are reported, the lessons that men and women
learn about the workplace will continue to reproduce within
other workplaces when they leave the judiciary. Worse yet,
women will simply leave the legal profession,28 only exacer-
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regarding these issues. She clerked for Judge Raymond Fisher on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Judge
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Court for the Central District of California.
bating the well-documented gender disparities within the pro-
fession.29 Your commitment to change can have a huge impact
on the profession.
Jaime A. Santos is an appellate litigation attor-
ney at Goodwin Procter LLP in Washington,
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This was a tumultuous year for the United States SupremeCourt. On June 21, 2018, Justice Anthony Kennedyannounced his retirement after 30 years on the Court.
And President Trump nominated Judge Brett Kavanaugh to fill
the seat. 
Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearings riveted and polar-
ized the nation. Late in the proceedings, multiple women
accused him of sexual misconduct. One of those women, Pro-
fessor Christine Blasey Ford, testified before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, detailing how Judge Kavanaugh allegedly
sexually assaulted her when they were in high school. Judge
Kavanaugh denied the allegations in emotional testimony that
triggered a letter from over 2,400 law professors asserting that
he “did not display the impartiality and judicial temperament
requisite to sit on the highest court of our land.”1 The Senate
nonetheless confirmed Justice Kavanaugh to the high court. 
With Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation arriving just 14
months after Justice Neil Gorsuch began his tenure, this is a
Court in transition, both in terms of its personnel and its
jurisprudence. This year’s criminal cases put that flux on dis-
play. The Court decided a high number of Fourth Amendment
cases this Term. The justices disagreed starkly over the future
of Fourth Amendment law, especially in the area of standing.
The Court also issued split decisions interpreting the First,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 
But before summarizing the Court’s criminal law cases from
2017–18, it’s worth pausing to remember Justice Kennedy’s
contributions to criminal law over the past three decades. 
JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY AND CRIMINAL LAW
In most criminal cases, Justice Kennedy voted with the con-
servative wing of the Court. He authored a number of signifi-
cant criminal procedure decisions, including Berghuis v.
Thompkins.2 There the Court held that Thompkins’s silence for
two hours and forty-five minutes was insufficient to invoke his
right to remain silent under Miranda. As one scholar put it,
Thompkins gave “us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids.”3
But Justice Kennedy’s greatest impact on criminal law was
in the death penalty area, where he commonly provided the
swing vote. Although never calling for complete abolishment,
Justice Kennedy joined his more liberal colleagues in narrow-
ing the penalty’s scope. 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Atkins v. Virginia,4
which held that executing persons with mental disabilities vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment. He then expanded on Atkins in
Roper v. Simmons.5 He wrote for the 5–4 Roper majority that the
“Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when
their crimes were committed.”6 He pointed to the “compara-
tive immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles,” to the fact
that “juveniles have less control, or less experience with con-
trol, over their own environment,” and that “the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”7
Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in Graham
v. Florida,8 which expanded on Roper. Graham held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for juveniles
who commit nonhomicide crimes. Roper and Graham then led
to Miller v. Alabama,9 where the Court held by 5–4 majority
that a mandatory life sentence without parole for any juvenile
offender violates the Eighth Amendment. 
The swing vote again came from Justice Kennedy in
Kennedy v. Louisiana.10 That case abolished the death penalty
for crimes not involving murder. “Evolving standards of
decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of
the person,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, “and the
punishment of criminals must conform to that rule.”11
Justice Kennedy also advocated for human dignity within
prisons. He wrote for the 5–4 majority in Brown v. Plata,12 hold-
ing that California prison overcrowding violated the Eighth
Amendment: “A prison that deprives prisoners of basic suste-
nance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with
the concept of human dignity and has no place in a civilized
society.”13 And in a recent concurrence in Davis v. Ayala,14 Jus-
tice Kennedy lamented the “terrible price”15 of the widespread
use of solitary confinement in American prisons. He cited
numerous studies showing the harmful effects of extended iso-
lation and ended by quoting Dostoyevsky: “The degree of civi-
lization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons.”16
162 Court Review - Volume 54 
A Term in Turmoil:
Select Criminal Cases from the 2017-18 Supreme Court Term
Juliana DeVries
17. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
18. 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018). 
19. 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018). 
20. 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). 
21. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
22. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
23. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
24. 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2217.
27. Id. at 2222. 
28. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
29. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
30. Id. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
31. Id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
32. Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Now on to the cases from the 2017–18 Term. 
FOURTH AMENDMENT
This Term was chock-full of significant Fourth Amendment
cases. The Court took particular interest in the concept of
“standing”: what a person must show to have a cognizable
Fourth Amendment interest allowing her to seek relief for an
unconstitutional search. Perhaps the most groundbreaking
Fourth Amendment opinion was Carpenter v. United States,17
where the Court held that a person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in her cell phone location information turned
over to a third party. Carpenter limits the so-called “third party
doctrine,” though it’s not clear how much. Another important
standing case, Byrd v. United States,18 held that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car even if she’s
not listed in the rental agreement. In Collins v. Virginia,19 the
Court decided officers need a warrant to search a vehicle
parked in the curtilage of a home. And in District of Columbia
v. Wesby20 the Court concluded that officers had probable cause
to arrest a group of trespassing partygoers and that the court
below erred by viewing facts in isolation. 
In Carpenter, police arrested four men suspected of rob-
bery, including Timothy Carpenter. Federal prosecutors
obtained telecommunications records from Carpenter’s wire-
less carriers. Those records included cell-site location informa-
tion (CSLI), time-stamped location data from each time Car-
penter’s phone connected to one of the carrier’s cell sites. The
government obtained 12,898 data points cataloging Carpen-
ter’s movements over 127 days. These data points created a
map of Carpenter’s location that placed him at the robbery. The
Sixth Circuit held that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the CSLI because he had turned that infor-
mation over to third parties: his wireless carriers. 
The Supreme Court reversed in a majority opinion written
by Chief Justice Roberts. “[A]n individual maintains a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical move-
ments as captured through CSLI.”21 The government therefore
needed a warrant, supported by probable cause, to obtain Car-
penter’s CSLI. 
This was significant because the Court has long held that “a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”22 This is the so-called
third-party doctrine. The doctrine originated in United States v.
Miller,23 where the Court held that a person lacked an expecta-
tion of privacy in bank records turned over to the bank. In Smith
v. Maryland, another foundational third-party doctrine case, the
Court similarly held that a person didn’t have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in outgoing phone numbers dialed on a
landline telephone and conveyed to the phone company.  
CSLI is, the Court held in Carpenter, “qualitatively differ-
ent.”24 Unlike the information
turned over to third parties in
Miller and Smith, “cell phone
location information is detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled.”25 The Court rea-
soned that, “when Smith was
decided in 1979, few could have
imagined a society in which a
phone goes wherever its owner
goes, conveying to the wireless
carrier not just dialed digits, but
a detailed and comprehensive
record of the person’s move-
ments.”26 And “CSLI is an
entirely different species of busi-
ness record—something that implicates basic Fourth Amend-
ment concerns about arbitrary government power much more
directly than corporate tax or payroll ledgers.”27 So even
though Carpenter conveyed his data to a third party, he could
claim Fourth Amendment protection in it. 
The Court also relied on United States v. Jones,28 which held
that attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle was a Fourth
Amendment search. CSLI presents an even greater privacy con-
cern than the GPS monitoring considered in Jones because
individuals “compulsively carry cell phones with them all the
time . . . into private residences, doctor’s officers, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales,”29 allow-
ing the government to achieve near-perfect, retroactive sur-
veillance of almost anyone. 
Cell phone users also take no affirmative steps to turn
over CSLI to the third-party carrier. Because carrying a cell
phone is indispensable to modern life, Carpenter “in no
meaningful sense” voluntarily turned his information over
to a third party. 
No fewer than four dissenting opinions were filed in this
case. Justice Kennedy argued that the majority unnecessarily
departed from the Court’s third-party doctrine precedents. In a
separate dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the CSLI wasn’t
Carpenter’s property, so he did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion in it. He called the Katz reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test “a failed experiment”30 and would get rid of it
entirely. Justice Alito’s dissent criticized the majority for desta-
bilizing Fourth Amendment law and argued that “the records
are not Carpenter’s in any sense.”31
Justice Gorsuch would get rid of the third-party doctrine
and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. He does
“not agree with the Court’s decision today to keep Smith and
Miller on life support and supplement them with a new and
multilayered inquiry that seems to be only Katz-squared.”32
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He’d overrule those cases and
“look to a more traditional Fourth
Amendment approach.”33
Although the majority called
this a “narrow” decision,34 it’s
likely to have broad impact. The
third-party doctrine now appears
to be, as Justice Gorsuch wrote,
“on life support.”35
This was a welcome develop-
ment for those concerned with privacy rights in the digital age.
The third-party doctrine has faced mounting criticism in
recent years, most notably from Justice Sotomayor, who in
2012 called the doctrine, “ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”36
And CSLI isn’t the only type of encyclopedic information
people reveal to third parties on a daily basis: “Emailing, tweet-
ing, instant messaging, surfing searching liking, and down-
loading all create an inescapable trail of third-party records
that may raise constitutional concerns on par with CSLI.”37
Advocates can now plausibly argue that an officer needs a war-
rant to obtain various kinds of digital data turned over to third
parties. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and American
Civil Liberties Union have already filed lawsuits in Massachu-
setts and Maine seeking to expand Carpenter to warrantless
searches of real-time (as opposed to historical) cell phone loca-
tion information.38
Like Carpenter, Byrd tackled Fourth Amendment “stand-
ing,” but in a different context. There, an officer had stopped
and searched a rental car driven by Terrence Byrd. Byrd wasn’t
listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver. The
Court unanimously held, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy,
that “as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession
and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list him or her
as an authorized driver.”39 Byrd could therefore challenge the
search of the car. On remand, the Supreme Court invited the
court below to address whether a person who intentionally
uses a third party to rent a car by fraudulent scheme is no bet-
ter than a thief.
Byrd had argued in the alternative that he had Fourth
Amendment standing because of his common-law property
interest in the rental car as a second bailee. This argument
arises from Jones, where the Court found that attaching a GPS
device to a vehicle was a Fourth Amendment search based on
common-law trespass law, rather than on the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test from Katz v. United States.40 But Byrd
failed to raise this argument in the District Court or Court of
Appeals, so the majority declined to address it. 
Justice Alito wrote a concurrence listing factors that may
bear on a driver’s ability to claim a Fourth Amendment inter-
est in a rental car. Justice Thomas authored an additional,
intriguing concurrence that Justice Gorsuch joined. He
expressed “serious doubts about the ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ test from Katz v. United States.”41 He then explains the
types of arguments he’d like to hear from future litigants on
common-law property rights concepts and the Fourth Amend-
ment. He asks litigants to argue “what kind of property inter-
est . . . individuals need before something can be considered
‘their . . . effec[t]’ under the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment” and “what body of law determines whether that
property interest is present.”42
The Third Circuit has now considered Byrd on remand from
the Supreme Court. It initially declined to suppress the fruit of
the search because it was authorized by circuit precedent at the
time it was conducted, so the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applied. On rehearing, though, the court
vacated that ruling and sent the case back to the district court
for additional fact-finding.43
Collins also involved a vehicle search—this time of a
motorcycle parked in a driveway adjacent to a home. A police
officer had probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was
stolen. So he walked up the driveway, lifted a tarp covering
the motorcycle, and found the license plate and vehicle iden-
tification numbers. The officer then ran the numbers, con-
firming the theft. The parties agreed that lifting the tarp was
a search under the Fourth Amendment. The issue was
whether the officer needed a warrant, which he didn’t have,
to do the search.
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, said yes.
A house’s curtilage includes its driveway. The automobile
exception to the warrant requirement didn’t apply because that
exception’s scope “extends no further than the automobile
itself.”44 The officer invaded the space of the curtilage before
reaching the motorcycle, and the Fourth Amendment protects
that space, so he needed a warrant. This is no different from an
officer who sees a stolen motorcycle through the window of a
living room and then enters the house to search the vehicle. 
Justice Thomas wrote another concurrence favoring major
changes to settled Fourth Amendment law. He argued that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to the states because it “appears
nowhere in the Constitution, postdates the founding by more
than a century, and contradicts several longstanding principles
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of the common law.”45 As federal common law, Justice Thomas
asserts, the exclusionary rule doesn’t bind the states. 
Justice Alito wrote the lone dissent, arguing that the search
was reasonable because the motorcycle “could have been
uncovered and ridden away in a matter of seconds” and the
officer’s “brief walk up the driveway impaired no real privacy
interests.”46 He quoted Oliver Twist: “If that is the law” then
“‘the law is a ass—a idiot.’”47
Wesby is an odd little case. It considered a lawsuit by sixteen
individuals against officers of the District of Columbia for ille-
gally arresting them during a debaucherous party in a house
they didn’t have permission to occupy. The officers arrived at the
house at 1:00 AM in response to a noise complaint. Upon entry,
they smelled marijuana and saw beer bottles and cups of liquor
on a filthy floor. There was no furniture downstairs except a few
metal chairs. A makeshift strip club was operating in the living
room and a naked woman and several men were in an upstairs
bedroom, where open condom wrappers were strewn about on
a bare mattress. The partygoers scattered and hid when the offi-
cers arrived. The partygoers also gave conflicting stories as to
why they were there. The Court held that these facts gave the
officers probable cause to arrest the partygoers for trespassing.
The court below erred by finding innocent explanations for each
fact in isolation: “The totality-of-the-circumstances test ‘pre-
cludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.’”48
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Court decided one double jeopardy case of note this
Term. Currier v. Virginia49 was a 5–4 decision holding that a
defendant can waive a double jeopardy claim by agreeing to a
severance. Michael Currier was acquitted of burglary and lar-
ceny charges, then tried separately on a felon-in-possession
charge. The government’s theory in its felon-in-possession case
was that Currier had the gun during that same burglary and
larceny. Currier argued that this violated his double jeopardy
rights, even though he’d consented to the severance. 
The Court disagreed. Justices Alito and Thomas and Chief
Justice Roberts joined Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion. It
held that Currier gave up his right to challenge the second trial
on double jeopardy grounds by agreeing to the severance. The
plurality then wrote that the Double Jeopardy Clause doesn’t
include a right to issue preclusion at all. Justice Kennedy con-
curred but only on the grounds that Currier consented to the
second trial and so can’t complain of it.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. She argued that Currier’s con-
sent to a severance didn’t waive his right to rely on the issue-
preclusive effect of acquittal. After all, courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of a constitu-
tional right. Justice Ginsburg also took issue with the plural-
ity’s quest to “take us back to the
days before the Court recognized
issue preclusion as a constitution-
ally grounded component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.”50 She
“would not engage in that
endeavor to restore things past.”51
SIXTH AMENDMENT
This Term the Court decided
two noteworthy Sixth Amend-
ment cases: an important case on
decision making in the attorney-client relationship and one
per curiam reversal. 
In McCoy v. Louisiana,52 Court considered a defendant’s right
not to admit guilt at his capital murder trial. Robert McCoy was
charged with three counts of murder. He expressly objected to
his attorney’s strategy of admitting guilt at trial to try to avoid
the death penalty. The attorney reasonably believed that the evi-
dence against McCoy was overwhelming and so told the jury at
the guilt phase that McCoy was guilty to gain credibility and
ask for their mercy at the sentencing phase.  
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. It held that “a
defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admit-
ting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that
confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the
death penalty.”53 Like the decisions whether to plead guilty,
waive the right to a jury trial, testify, and forgo an appeal, the
decision whether “the objective of the defense is to assert inno-
cence” belongs to the defendant. The Sixth Amendment “‘speaks
of the “assistance” of counsel, and an assistant, however expert,
is still an assistant.’”54 This is true even if the client has mental
health issues, as McCoy himself appears to have had.
In Florida v. Nixon,55 the Court had held that defense coun-
sel could concede a capital defendant’s guilt at trial when the
defendant neither consents nor objects to that strategy. The
majority opinion in McCoy distinguished Nixon in that
McCoy “vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the
charged acts and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt.”
It is therefore error for defense counsel to admit a capital defen-
dant’s guilt over his express objection but not if he says nothing.
The Court further held in McCoy that the Sixth Amendment
violation was structural error not amenable to harmless error
review. It also noted that McCoy’s lawyer wouldn’t have vio-
lated his ethical obligations by presenting his client’s proposed
alibi defense, as there was no avowed perjury.  
Justice Alito wrote a dissent that Justices Thomas and Gor-
such joined. He argued that McCoy’s attorney didn’t actually
admit guilt because he told the jury that McCoy lacked the req-
uisite intent. McCoy’s attorney thus only admitted one element
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of the offense—that McCoy killed
three people—but not that he was
guilty. 
Sexton v. Beaudreaux56 was a
per curiam reversal of the Ninth
Circuit’s grant of habeas relief on
ineffective assistance of counsel
grounds. Nicholas Beaudreaux
was convicted of murder in Cali-
fornia and sentenced to fifty years
to life. A witness to the shooting
identified Beaudreaux at a pretrial hearing and then at trial.
He’d been shown two photo lineups of Beaudreaux earlier but
had only tentatively identified him from those. Beaudreaux
argued in his habeas petition that his trial attorney was inef-
fective for failing to file a motion to suppress the identification.
The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the circumstances sur-
rounding the identification were unduly suggestive because
Beaudreaux’s photo was in both photo lineups.
The Supreme Court disagreed. “The Ninth Circuit’s opinion
was not just wrong. It also committed fundamental errors that
this Court has repeatedly admonished courts to avoid.”57
Because this was a federal habeas petition, the Ninth Circuit
needed to give the state court decision more deference. Once
again, the Supreme Court is seen reigning in the Ninth Circuit
in a habeas case.58
FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
The Court decided two remarkable Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clause cases this Term: Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission59 and Trump v. Hawaii.60
These weren’t criminal cases but will likely impact future crim-
inal cases that implicate the religion clauses, such as those
where a criminal defendant alleges that the charged statute dis-
criminates against her religion.   
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court held that the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of a baker who objected
to baking a cake for a same-sex wedding violated the baker’s
right to freely exercise his religion. The Commissioner made
statements on the record that the Court found hostile to the
baker’s sincerely held religious beliefs: 
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to jus-
tify all kinds of discrimination throughout history,
whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust,
whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of sit-
uations where freedom of religion has been used to jus-
tify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to
use their religion to hurt others.61
The Commission also treated other bakers’ conscience-
based objections differently from Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
claim. This “violated that State’s duty under the First Amend-
ment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion
or religious viewpoint.”62
Justice Kagan wrote a concurrence that Justice Breyer
joined. It argued there were permissible ways in which the
Commission could have distinguished the other conscience-
based objections. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate concur-
rence, which Justice Alito joined, disagreeing with Justice
Kagan’s concurrence. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gor-
such, wrote yet another concurrence, arguing that the Com-
mission violated the baker’s freedom of expression in addition
to his free exercise rights. Justice Ginsburg authored a dissent
that Justice Sotomayor joined. In her opinion, the “different
outcomes the Court features don’t evidence hostility to religion
of the kind we have previously held to signal a free-exercise
violation, nor do the comments by one or two members of one
of the four decisionmaking entities considering this case jus-
tify reversing the judgment below.”63
Trump v. Hawaii64 was a closely watched case in which the
Court considered the constitutionality of Trump’s second exec-
utive order limiting immigration from designated countries.
Trump’s first executive order suspended people from entering
the country from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen. This caused massive protests at airports across the
country.65 The Western District of Washington entered a
restraining order blocking that executive order and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Trump then replaced his first executive order
with a Proclamation restricting entry from Iran, North Korea,
Syria, Chad, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Venezuela. 
The plaintiffs in Trump v. Hawaii argued that the Proclama-
tion violates the Establishment Clause because it was moti-
vated by animus toward Islam. They relied on statements
Trump made during his campaign, such as his “Statement on
Preventing Muslim Immigration,” where he called for a “total
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States
until our Country’s representatives can figure out what is going
on” and his statement that “Islam hates us.”66 They also noted
that, after Trump’s inauguration, Rudolph Giuliani said in a
television interview that Trump had asked him to find a way to
do his “Muslim ban” legally.67
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tice Roberts, that the facially neutral Proclamation didn’t vio-
late the Establishment Clause because “the admission and
exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments
largely immune from judicial control.’”68
The Court also took the opportunity to overrule Korematsu
v. United States, albeit in meticulously narrow language: “The
forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps,
solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlaw-
ful and outside the scope of Presidential authority.”69
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the apparent
inconsistencies between Masterpiece Cakeshop and Hawaii v.
Trump. She also criticized the majority’s deference to the exec-
utive branch:
By blindly accepting the Government’s misguided
invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated
by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name
of a superficial claim of national security, the Court rede-
ploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu
and merely replaces one “gravely wrong” decision with
another. 
The Constitution demands, and our country
deserves, a Judiciary willing to hold the coordinate
branches to account when they defy our most sacred
legal commitments.70
TIDBITS
This Term the Court also decided a couple federal habeas
cases worth brief mention. It also avoided ruling on the merits
of two important criminal cases likely to come back before the
Court in the future.  
Wilson v. Sellers71 held that when a federal court considers a
federal habeas petition challenging an unexplained state rul-
ing, it should “look through” the summary decision to the last
related state-court decision providing a rationale.  Tharpe v.
Sellers72 was a per curiam reversal of the Eleventh Circuit,
which had disposed of Tharpe’s petition to reopen his federal
habeas proceeding.  Tharpe claims that his jury was biased
against him based on his race.  He has a sworn affidavit from a
white juror stating that “there are two types of black people: 1.
Black folks and 2. Niggers” and that Tharpe, “who wasn’t in
the ‘good’ black folks category in my book, should get the elec-
tric chair for what he did;” the juror also said he wondered if
“black people even have souls.”73
In Kansas v. Vogt,74 the Court was set to decide whether
using statements at a pretrial hearing violates the Fifth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against compelling a person to be a witness
against himself.  The Court dismissed the case as improvi-
dently granted, leaving a circuit split in place. 
The Court similarly declined to decide the merits in United
States v. Sanchez–Gomez.75 There the Ninth Circuit had held
that shackling pretrial detainees violates the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that the case was moot because the
defendants were no longer in pretrial detention. 
THE TERM AHEAD
The 2018–19 Term is now underway, with the Court set to
decide many important criminal cases this year. It has granted
cert in Gamble v. United States, which asks it to overrule the
separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause
and hold that a person can’t be convicted of the same crime at
the state and federal levels. 
In Timbs v. Indiana, the Court will decide if the Excessive
Fines Clause is incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. At stake is whether the states can
impose excessive civil forfeiture and other fines on criminal
defendants, who are usually already impoverished.76
Garza v. Idaho is a Sixth Amendment case worth watching.
The Court will decide whether there’s a presumption of preju-
dice when a client tells her attorney to file a notice of appeal
and the attorney doesn’t do so because the client’s plea agree-
ment included an appeal waiver.
The Court will also consider two death penalty cases of
note—without, of course, the input of retired Justice Kennedy.
In Madison v. Alabama, the Court will consider whether the
Eighth Amendment prohibits executing an inmate with severe
dementia that prevents him from remembering his crime and
understanding his execution. Renowned civil rights attorney
Bryan Stevenson argued on Madison’s behalf. 
Bucklew v. Precythe involves an inmate with a rare medical
condition, who seeks to bring an as-applied Eighth Amend-
ment challenge to Missouri’s lethal injection protocol. The case
may very well turn on Justice Kavanaugh’s vote. He seemed
sympathetic to the inmate’s claim at oral argument, asking Mis-
souri’s attorney: “Are you saying even if the method creates
gruesome and brutal pain you can still do it because there’s no
alternative?”77
The real question is how Justice Kennedy’s replacement will
alter the course of death penalty law in the years to come.
Juliana DeVries is an Appellate Assistant Fed-
eral Public Defender for the Northern District
of California and a former Ninth Circuit clerk.
(The views expressed are her own and not those
of her employer.)
68. Id. at 2418.
69. Id. at 2422. 
70. Id. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
71. 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018).
72. 138 S. Ct. 545 (2018) (per curiam).
73. Id. at 546.
74. 138 S. Ct. 1638 (2018).
75. 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018).
76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUST.
ASSISTANCE, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPE-
CIAL REPORT 3 N.1 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/
181160.pdf (estimating that 60–90% of all criminal cases involve
indigent defendants).
77. Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Bucklew v. Precythe
(2018) (No. 17-8151), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/17-8151_8n59.pdf.
Footnotes
1. My very first legal job was as a law clerk at the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, and I stayed there for five years. I could not
have loved it more. 
2. REX STOUT, PLOT IT YOURSELF (1986). 
3. She also murdered three people, but this is neither here nor there.
4. Because I drafted the opinions, the correct answer to this one is
“snarky.”
5. Punctuated by that perennial favorite: “We could be done by now
if you’d just listen!”
For eleven years, I have taught new legal writers. I primar-ily teach UNC Law’s 1L research, writing, and advocacyclass, but in recent years have also taught an upper-level
seminar titled Judicial Clerkship Writing for those students
interested in learning to write like a clerk.1 The students in
both classes differ in skill level, naturally, but they have in
common that they have never before done the type of writing
the class requires of them.
Judges do much the same. Each time a new clerk or intern
joins your chambers, you start training and guiding anew.
Below are five increasingly specific tips on how to make that
process as smooth as possible. 
TRAIN THEM TO BE GHOSTWRITERS; TEACH THEM YOUR
VOICE. 
In one of Rex Stout’s delightful Nero Wolfe mysteries,2 a
woman perpetrates a scheme in which she would write a
slightly different version of a recently published novel, plant it
among the rejected manuscripts inside the publishing house
itself, and then sue the publishing house for plagiarism.3 Wolfe
reads all the rejected manuscripts and realizes based on subtle
style cues that they were all written by the same person, and
that the same person had written a novel published by one of
those houses. Wolfe gathers all the players together into his
office, and—as he is dramatically exposing the woman’s
crimes—she explains: “I realized how stupid I had been not to
write them in a different style, but you see I didn’t really know
I had a style. I thought only good writers had a style.”
Most law clerks, I believe, become law clerks because they
love to write. In law school, students—particularly the good
writers—develop their own writing style and voice as they
write seminar papers, law review articles, etc. Inevitably, when
they become law clerks, it’s an adjustment to adopt the voice
of their judges. But the first step, of course, is for them to
notice that their judge has a particular voice. 
When I introduce my seminar students to the fictional
judge for whom they’ll be clerking over the semester, I give
them three of “her” opinions and have them fill out a style
sheet as to the judge’s preferences as evidenced by those opin-
ions. The style sheet is broken into four categories and
includes specific questions:
• Overall structure. How long do the judge’s fact sections tend
to be? What general internal structure does she use for the
discussion of each distinct legal issue? How does she sepa-
rate arguments (e.g., Roman numerals? signal words?)? 
• Formatting/small-scale structure. What is the judge’s stan-
dard paragraph length? Does she seem to prefer the use of
block quotes? In citing, does she use (citation omitted) or
not?
• Word choice. Does she prefer defendant, Defendant, defen-
dant-appellant, etc.? What transition phrases does she often
use (e.g., “Here” to move back to the case at hand)? Does
she use many adverbs? How does she feel about starting
sentences with “And” or “But”?
• General qualities. How would you describe her tone?4 Does
she focus on the moving/appealing party specifically or give
equal time to both parties’ arguments? How much dicta
appears in her opinions?
The more you can memorialize instructions, FAQs, and
style guides, the more time you will save with the orientation
of each new clerk or intern—and the more consistency your
chambers style will have from year to year.
BE EXPLICIT ABOUT WHAT YOU EXPECT FROM THEM. 
One night, when my son was 3, I was sitting on a chair in
his room trying to apply his post-bath lotion—a task I would
wish only on my worst enemy—and he refused to stay still,
dancing out of reach every few seconds. Like exasperated
mothers everywhere, I put on my stern voice and said: “Come
back here! Be still!”5 After several rounds of this, I planted my
feet on the floor shoulder-width apart, pointed to the carpet
between my feet, and said: “Come stand right here.” He came
straight to that spot and stayed there for the duration.
I realized belatedly that “come here” and “be still,” which
encompass abstract concepts like “be within arm’s reach” and
“then wait for an unspecified amount of time,” meant nothing
to him. When I gave him a specific, concrete, achievable goal,
he was able—and happy—to comply.
The more transparent and explicit you are about your expec-
tations—both in terms of process and in terms of the ultimate
product your clerks or interns need to produce—the easier it’ll
be for your new hires to fit smoothly into your chambers. Be
mindful about telling the clerk or intern which exact thing you
want. Some points to consider about helping your clerks and
interns transition from a law school environment:
In law school, almost all writing assignments involve
writing a document for a client for one purpose and then
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6. This may or may not be, but definitely is, what happened to the first
draft I submitted to a clerk as a judicial intern. It was quite possi-
bly the most helpful feedback I could have received at the time.
7. Indeed, despite the opinions being of almost identical length, the
Court of Appeals opinion spends almost 60 lines applying the law
to the facts of the case, while the Supreme Court spends only 8.
not revisiting or reusing it. In chambers, pieces of writ-
ing might get used repeatedly for different reasons; for
example, some judges like for their clerks to produce
bench briefs solely to prepare for oral arguments, mean-
ing that they don’t want a particularly thorough or for-
mal bench brief, while others expect a bench brief to be
essentially a draft opinion. Tell them which you prefer.
In law school, email assignments and memos are sent
straight to a professor, they go no further, and they’re
evaluated on their merits; in chambers, you only ask for
such things when you’re going to use them for a partic-
ular reason. If you’ve requested an email analyzing a spe-
cific legal question, are you going to use it to inform your
end of a phone conversation, or are you going to forward
it to the person involved? When you ask for that evalua-
tion of a circulating opinion, is it with an eye toward
concurring or dissenting or just to help you make up
your mind? 
In law school, we draw very specific boundaries
around how much students may collaborate and how
they should format submissions; tell your clerks and
interns what you expect from them in terms of collabo-
ration and what they send you. Should your clerks edit
each others’ writing before you see it, and should they
edit interns’ work first too? Do you prefer seeing drafts
on paper or by computer? Should they save progressive
versions of opinions or just change the same file? Do you
like to see redlined subsequent drafts?  
You’re an expert: on the law, on drafting, and on your cham-
bers. As an expert, your experience fills in the gaps for you on
big projects or tasks, but new clerks and interns will need
those gaps filled in with explicit instructions. Laying out
exactly what you need them to produce or accomplish will get
you the best results. 
AS MUCH AS YOU CAN, PROVIDE CONCRETE WRITING
FEEDBACK. 
Every writing professor knows the feeling of having a stu-
dent submit a first draft that needs improvement on virtually
every level. The challenge then becomes triaging your con-
cerns so that you address the most fundamental concerns first,
leaving aside the finer points for a later draft. 
I explain this to my students with a weeding metaphor: you
can spend an hour pulling weeds out of your garden, filling
multiple bags with your jagged-leaved enemies, and then—
usually just as you turn back to look, satisfied, at your good
work—you’ll see dozens of tiny weeds in and among your
flowers that you couldn’t see before because of those larger
weeds on top. The only way to root out the problems on every
level is to go through many rounds of weeding, looking at a
smaller scale each time.
It is immensely time-consuming to identify aspects of a
draft that need improvement, explain why and how to make
that improvement, and then review
the resulting edits. By far, the easi-
est thing to do with new writers is
to correct their work and move on.
But if you can invest the time early
on to give them thorough and spe-
cific feedback, you will save your-
self an enormous amount of work
in the long run. If you have the
luxury of time, make comments on
the first draft and walk through
them with your clerk; if not, give
them redlines so that they can see
the changes between their draft
and your version.
Your new law clerks will not be
used to the focus and clean lines of
judicial opinions, and they will need practice and coaching to
get there. One of my most frequent (and most useful) com-
ments on student papers is: This isn’t wrong; it just isn’t neces-
sary. If you can briefly cover this concept in a chambers style
guide or an early conversation, you will likely save yourself the
trouble of handing back drafts with a third of the pages simply
crossed out. 6
REMEMBER THAT THEY MIGHT NOT KNOW HOW TO
WRITE FOR YOUR COURT. 
One of the early classes in my seminar opens with a lecture
about the roles of the various courts. As upper-level students,
they of course already know the structure of both the federal
and state court systems, but it hasn’t always occurred to them
that those courts’ discrete roles will, by necessity, affect those
courts’ writings.
In that same class, I hand the students two opinions for the
same case—one from the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
and the subsequent one from the North Carolina Supreme
Court—with the lines numbered in the margins. They map out
the structure and content of each, noting as they go the line
numbers for each chunk of information (e.g., lines 30-40
introduce the issue on appeal). By the end, they’ve deduced
several distinctions: the Court of Appeals opinion is to the
point, focuses on the defendant, and emphasizes the facts of
this specific case; meanwhile, the Supreme Court opinion is
more sweeping, focuses on issues of law, and emphasizes the
case’s role in the larger jurisprudence of the state.7 Despite
their knowing in an abstract way the roles of the courts, stu-
dents still tend to be surprised by this discovery, presumably
because they simply have not made the conscious connection
between a court’s role and its output.  
Thus, you might find that, despite your providing example
opinions from your chambers, your new clerk is producing
law-review-style surveys of the law at your error-correcting
court, or streamlined resolutions of the case before the court at
your policy-setting court. Knowing how to find, read, and
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write about the law is a very general set of skills. Even if your
clerks have summer experience in chambers—even if it was
with your chambers—they will need some time and help to get
up to speed with the very specific writing expected by clerks
for your court. 
HELP THEM MAKE DELIBERATE CHOICES IN STORY-
TELLING. 
I still vividly remember the more colorful cases on which I
worked as a law clerk, and your new law clerks will almost cer-
tainly be drawn to the fascinating storytelling opportunities
afforded by their new caseload in your chambers. They will
also—as good legal writers and simply as storytellers—
instinctively want to recount the entire story in the opinions
they draft for you. The instinct they will need to develop
instead is the ability to discern how much of the story to tell.
When my seminar students are drafting their opinions, we
have a series of discussions about choosing what to include in
an opinion. Part of this is informed by the judge’s style, of
course, but I emphasize to them the importance of making
very deliberate choices in their writing.
This past spring, for example, my seminar students wrote
their opinions about a case in which a pizza delivery man was
attacked by two assailants with a baseball bat. The issues on
appeal—admission of evidence, basis for a search warrant, and
duplicative indictments—could easily be addressed without a
detailed recounting of the underlying assault. In their first
drafts, however, many students spent several hundred words
describing the assault in extensive detail, down to the linger-
ing physical effects on the victim. In my feedback, I flagged
those sections and left a comment that simply asked: Why?
That is, why are you spending this much time on the incident?
I emphasized that I was not instructing them to change the fact
section, but rather requesting that they consciously decide on
the reasons behind it. Later, in class, the students pair up for
peer feedback on the fact section; after the partner reads it, the
author explains his or her choices, structure, etc., and together
the pair discusses improvements.
When we come back together as a class, I suggest that they
think of an attorney reading this opinion in the future. What
words will he latch onto to supplement his spurious argu-
ment? What inferences will he draw from the lengthy discus-
sion of the victim’s injuries? Will he argue to a court that
because the injuries to the victim in his case were not so
severe, this opinion does not apply? Will he latch onto the
short window between the assault and police arrival empha-
sized by your timeline as a distinguishing factor?
This recursive and deliberate (and somewhat cynical)
examination of their fact sections is most important as a pre-
lude to the students doing the same with their legal analysis. If
I can cultivate in them that mindset of making deliberate
choices based on a hypothetical lawyer mining their opinions
for implications, policies, or warnings that were never
intended, they can edit their legal analysis all the more pre-
cisely on their own.
Sara B. Warf, J.D., is a Clinical Associate Pro-
fessor at the University of North Carolina
School of Law. There, she teaches both
Research, Reasoning, Writing, and Advocacy to
first-year students and Judicial Clerkship Writ-
ing to second- and third-year students. Before
that, she spent five years clerking at the North
Carolina Court of Appeals and three years as an
appellate attorney. She can be reached at swarf@email.unc.edu,
and she tweets quite often from @SaraBWarf.
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Courts have an important place in American life. Whilemany would think first of the police as the institutionmost directly responsible for maintaining the law, the
courts are an integral part of ensuring social order. Indeed, as
illustrated by practices regarding warrants and cases challeng-
ing police action, much of the authority typically attributed to
the police is, to some degree, controlled by the courts. 
Importantly, however, as is often the case with institutions
of government in the United States, this considerable author-
ity comes with relatively limited power: The judiciary controls
“neither the purse nor the sword,” leaving it heavily reliant
upon other institutions and upon the public in general.1 Thus,
an extreme argument can be made that the courts need the pos-
itive perceptions of the majority of the public to function at
all,2 but others have pointed to these perceptions as important
simply because effective courts should be perceived well by the
public they serve.3 In either case, there is little question that
public perceptions of the courts matter and in recognition of
this, considerable effort has been expended by to improve and
protect them.4
TRUST
A wide variety of constructs have been investigated within
this umbrella notion of “public perceptions of the state courts”
and include constructs like confidence, legitimacy, cynicism,
support, and so on,5 but one especially important construct is
trust. From the National Conference on Public Trust and Con-
fidence in the Justice System in 19996 to the more recent
National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice,7
trust is widely recognized as critical for positive court-com-
munity relationships. Despite the strong emphasis on the con-
struct, however, consistency in conceptualization has been elu-
sive. In fact, courts scholarship contains at least three impor-
tantly different understandings.
The first of these “versions of trust” arises primarily from
the scholarship addressing the Process Model of Legitimacy.
This model suggests that procedural concerns are especially
important for evaluations of legal authorities8 and has been
supported by an impressive body of research, especially in the
policing context.9 Trust has an important role in this literature
but, notably, its specific nature is not well-defined.10 Instead,
this “trust” is variously understood as an outcome or driver of
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procedural justice, as a subcomponent or operationalization of
legitimacy, or as an umbrella term for all perceptions of legal
authorities.11 It suffices, however, to say that this account of
trust is strongly tied to legitimacy in that both center on a per-
ception that the courts should have authority. Thus, this
account suggests that when courts behave or are expected to
behave appropriately as authorities, they will be trusted.
The second version of trust arises from political science
scholarship. Although much of this work focuses on percep-
tions of the United States Supreme Court,12 some has
addressed perceptions of the state courts specifically.13 Trust
within this literature is also somewhat inconsistently defined
but is usually associated with constructs like confidence and
support. In one of the only explicit definitions presented in
this literature, George Dougherty and colleagues argue that
trust is a fiduciary concept that concerns whether the courts
fulfill expectations.14 Thus, within this literature, trust is
strongly connected to perceptions of satisfaction with the
courts such that trust is a function of their ability to address
public expectations regarding the services they provide. 
The third version of trust in the courts comes from the
broader literature on trust more generally.15 In this work,
scholars across contexts are increasingly settling on an under-
standing of trust as a willingness to accept vulnerability to the
agency of the target of that trust.16 This account differs from
the previous two by suggesting that trust resides not in an
evaluation of the courts themselves, but is instead a psycho-
logical state or feeling within the trustor that orients them
toward acting in ways that accept their vulnerability to harm
from the direct actions of the courts.17 Thus, within this
account, trust exists when the public, recognizing this poten-
tial for harm, remains willing to work with—or at least not
against—them.
VULNERABILITY AND THE COURTS
I argue that operating from this third account has especially
strong potential to foster efforts that most successfully improve
and protect the court-community relationship, but this
requires the acceptance of two fundamental arguments: (1)
that there is potential for harm to the public in the court-com-
munity relationship and (2) that the courts are at least per-
ceived to have some level of control over this potential for
harm. 
Regarding the first argument, the most obvious potential
harms controlled by the courts are faced by defendants. For
these individuals, appearing in court necessarily opens them
up to potential harm in both outcome (e.g., an unnecessarily
harsh verdict) and process (e.g., an inability to tell their side of
the story), but other participants in court proceedings are not
immune. For example, victims risk that their attacker could go
free and witnesses risk public embarrassment in an inconsid-
erate examination. For these and other individuals, coopera-
tion with the courts requires at least a tacit acceptance of the
fact that they could experience these and other harms.
In addition to the potential for harm to participants in court
proceedings, the court-community relationship also involves
the potential for harm to the wider public. A 2009 survey by
the National Center for State Courts suggested that a little less
than half of the population has not had direct contact with the
courts.18 Nonetheless, it is important to remember that, given
their place in American life, the operation of the courts is not
inconsequential to these individuals, especially because of the
strong popular focus on them.19 Thus, one important potential
harm to this second public20 arises from violations of more
abstract notions of what the courts should be. For example,
when the courts are believed to have systemically disparate
impacts on minority communities, there is often a perceived
harm, even for individuals who are unlikely to experience
those disparate outcomes personally. The public outcry against
the abuses in Ferguson, Missouri, and the backlash against the
outcome of the case against Brock Turner both serve as
poignant reminders of the fact that even though the potential
for harm to the courts’ second public may be somewhat atten-
uated as compared to those who have had direct court contact,
it is nonetheless present and influential. 
The second argument upon which this conceptualization of
trust rests regards the courts’ role in addressing the probability
and intensity of these potential harms. As noted in the defini-
tion posed above, trust is a willingness to accept vulnerability,
specifically, to the agency21 of the courts. This agency is defined
as a perceived ability to make decisions that affect the potential
harm to the trustor. Thus, even though courts are typically
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bound to specific processes or decisions (e.g., sentencing
guidelines), the considerable power differential between the
courts and the public often means that the public still per-
ceives the courts as chiefly responsible for their decisions. This
account of trust suggests that when an individual trusts the
courts, they feel that even though there is a possibility that the
courts may cause (or at least allow) some level of harm, they
are willing to take a leap of faith22 and cooperate.
IMPLICATIONS
So what does this mean for judges as they go about their daily
work of hearing cases and interacting with the public? The most
important takeaway of this argument regarding the nature of
trust lies in the proposed centrality of perceived vulnerability. As
a result, efforts to improve public perceptions that explicitly
address salient vulnerabilities should be most effective. For
judges, addressing these vulnerabilities can be as simple as
remembering that even though the courts are primarily intended
to address harm, they do create at least the potential for harm
rooted in their agentic actions. To the extent that this conceptu-
alization of trust is applicable in the state courts context, taking
the time to understand and acknowledge the potential harms
that defendants, witnesses, jurors, and victims feel as they enter
the courtroom will help build trust. Adherence to procedural
justice and working to meet expectations in these interactions
will remain relevant, but directly addressing vulnerability allows
judges to acknowledge their power differential as it matters most
to the individual and to highlight the concerns that most
saliently get in the way of a positive relationship.
Although taking time to elicit and address these perceived
vulnerabilities may be helpful in all interactions with the pub-
lic, it may well be that these discussions would be disruptive to
individual proceedings. Instead, judges may be better served by
separate engagement efforts that seek to bring representatives
into a dialogue with the court to help understand the salient
vulnerabilities that may impede a more positive relationship.
Many previous court engagement efforts have peripherally
addressed assumed vulnerabilities but most have not, as yet,
allowed these issues to take center stage: Rather than working
with communities to identify and then explicitly address the
public’s perceived vulnerabilities, most engagement efforts start
by working to determine knowledge or service gaps and work
to address them directly. Although these approaches may, in
fact, address vulnerabilities that communities feel, these prob-
lem-centered approaches may fail to allow sufficient space for
community members to highlight specific vulnerabilities as
they see them. What is needed are efforts that seek specifically
to identify the potential harms that the public is concerned
about and then work to provide the assurances necessary to
help the public see that the courts are not only aware of these
specific concerns but are worthy of being entrusted with them.
A second implication of this account of trust lies in what it
suggests about measurement. Increasingly, courts are working
to integrate monitoring and evaluation efforts that allow them
to determine efficacy, and to identify and adjust elements that
are less effective than expected. Comprehensive monitoring
and evaluation strategies often involve surveying court users or
the public generally about court processes (e.g., procedural fair-
ness), general evaluations (e.g., legitimacy and satisfaction),
and the respondents’ willingness to cooperate or actual cooper-
ation (e.g., willingness to bring current or future cases to court
for resolution). While these factors are important, the notion of
trust presented here suggests that they may neglect a critical
issue. Because trust as conceptualized here is neither an evalu-
ation of the courts nor cooperation with them, most existing
monitoring and evaluation efforts fail to account for it.23 This
may be an important oversight because evidence suggests that
trust be the intervening state that connects these evaluations to
cooperation behavior.24 This, however, should not be under-
stood to suggest that monitoring and evaluation not include
measures of evaluations or cooperation. Evaluations of the
courts should be measured, especially as performance indica-
tors. Applying this conceptualization of trust, however, sug-
gests that these perceptions will only lead to cooperation when
the individual is willing to accept their vulnerability. Similarly,
cooperation is also important to measure, but it can only be
directly addressed retroactively and in relation to specifically
identified behavior(s). Future behavior, however, by definition,
cannot be directly measured and, although it is interesting, ask-
ing people how likely they feel they would be to cooperate is not
necessarily reliable or valid. Measuring a willingness to accept
vulnerability to the agency of the courts may be closer to coop-
eration than evaluations of the courts and more applicable to a
variety of future cooperation behaviors than specific measures
of past or current cooperation. 
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inal Justice and Environmental Science at
Michigan State University. A psychologist by
training, his work lies at the nexus of govern-
ment and the public where he investigates what
trust is, how best to measure it, and its connec-
tion to outcomes like cooperation and compli-
ance. Hamm’s work has included research on
trust in courts and law enforcement, as well as other state and fed-
eral entities, and is designed to advance a cross-boundary social
science of trust. He has a Ph.D. in psychology and a Master of
Legal Studies degree from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. 
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This personal-security checklist is from the Judicial Family Institute
(http://www.judicialfamilyinstitute.org). The Judicial Family Institute is a
committee of the Conference of Chief Justices; its website has resources to
help judges and their families. More security tips can be found on their 
website under “Topics & Programs/Security.”
Footnotes
1. There are a number of ways in which a criminal case can reach the
Supreme Court of Canada by way of appeal. They involve obtain-
ing “leave to appeal” from the Supreme Court and appeals “as of
right”: (1) the Supreme Court can grant leave to appeal on a ques-
tion of law (see sections 691(1)(b) and 691(2)(c) of the Criminal
Code); (2) an accused person has a right to appeal to the Supreme
Court if a conviction is affirmed or an acquittal set aside on any
question of law upon which a judge of the Court of Appeal dis-
sents (see sections 691(1)(b) and 691(2)(a) of the Criminal
Code); (3) an accused person has a right to appeal to the Supreme
Court on a question of law if their acquittal at trial is set aside and
the Court of Appeal enters a verdict of guilty (see section
691(2)(b) of the Criminal Code); (4) the Crown can appeal as of
right when a conviction is set aside by a Court of Appeal if a judge
of the Court of Appeal dissents on a question of law (see section
693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code); (5) the Crown can appeal if
granted leave by the Supreme Court on a question of law when a
conviction is set aside by the Court of Appeal (see section
693(1)(b) of the Criminal Code); and (6) through the Supreme
Court Act, R.S.C. 1985.
2. R. v. Brassington, 2018 SCC 37 (Can.).
3. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 37(1). 
In this edition’s article, I will review decisions rendered by theSupreme Court of Canada concerning criminal law mattersduring the period of January 1 to October 31, 2018. As will be
seen, the Supreme Court considered a multitude of criminal law
issues, including the obligation of the Crown to disclose evi-
dence to the accused, the offences of influence peddling and
first-degree murder, and the impact of mistake of law in impos-
ing sentence and informer privilege. Let us start with the Court’s
consideration of the law of evidence and informer privilege.1
EVIDENCE
INFORMER PRIVILEGE AND SOLICITOR CLIENT COM-
MUNICATIONS:
In R. v. Brassington, four police officers with the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police were charged with offences, including an
attempt to obstruct the course of justice, relating to alleged
misconduct during a police investigation.2 The Supreme Court
noted that when the officers “were charged, the RCMP and the
Crown told them that they were prohibited from discussing
‘the circumstances of their investigations in a manner that
might reveal the identity of confidential informers to anyone,
including their legal counsel.’”
Before their trial, they applied for a declaration that they
could discuss with their defence counsel information they
learned during the investigation that might reveal the identity
of confidential informers. The application judge granted the
application, declaring that the officers could discuss any infor-
mation in their possession with counsel. She held that the
“requirement of proving ‘innocence at stake’ did not apply”
because the exception fit poorly in circumstances where “the
accused already knows the privileged information and merely
seeks to discuss it with counsel.”
The Crown and the RCMP applied pursuant to section 37 of
the Canada Evidence Act, for an order that disclosure be pro-
hibited:
[A] Minister of the Crown in right of Canada or other
official may object to the disclosure of information before
a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the
production of information by certifying orally or in writ-
ing to the court, person or body that the information
should not be disclosed on the grounds of a specified
public interest.3
The application judge dismissed the application. The Crown
appealed. The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal, holding that the order allowing disclosure was civil
rather than criminal in nature and thus an appeal under section
37(1) was unavailable.
The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court described the issue raised as being: “[W]hen
police officers are charged with crimes relating to their conduct
during an investigation, can they, at their own discretion, dis-
close to their defence lawyers information they learned during
that investigation that might reveal the identity of a confiden-
tial informer?”
The Supreme Court allowed the Crown’s appeal. It held that
the declaratory order should be set aside. It granted an order pur-
suant to section 37(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibiting
the officers from disclosing informer privileged information to
their counsel, subject to a successful innocence-at-stake applica-
tion. The Court indicated that “the ‘privilege should be infringed
only where core issues going to the guilt of the accused are
involved and there is a genuine risk of a wrongful conviction. 
. . .’ There are no other exceptions to informer privilege.” 
The Supreme Court concluded that the officers were not
entitled to disclose the informer-privileged information to their
lawyers: "Our jurisprudence prevents piercing informer privi-
lege unless the accused can show that his or her innocence is
at stake. . . . No evidence of 'innocence at stake' was presented.
The police officers are therefore not entitled to disclose the
information to their lawyers." 
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Finally, the Court held that 
requiring the police officers to exercise caution with
respect to what information they disclose to their
lawyers does not amount to a per se interference with
their constitutional rights. Police officers bear particular
responsibilities by virtue of the positions of power and
trust they occupy, including obligations to keep
informer-privileged information in the strictest confi-
dence. Neither the right to solicitor-client privilege nor
the right to make full answer and defence relieves police
officers of those obligations. 
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS:
In R. v. Cain, the accused was convicted of the offence of
sexual assault. A majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
(Justice Scanlon dissenting) dismissed his appeal.4
An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada as of
right. The Supreme Court considered the appeal based upon
the issue of whether the trial judge used a prior consistent
statement of the complainant to confirm the truth of her testi-
mony at the trial.
The appeal was dismissed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court stated:
The trial judge found that the inconsistencies
involved only insignificant peripheral matters, and so he
rejected Mr. Cain’s contention that any inconsistencies
rendered the complainant not credible or her evidence
unreliable. The trial judge did not rely on consistencies
between the statements and testimony to bolster the
truth of the complainant’s testimony. This was an appro-
priate use of a prior consistent statement and did not
constitute an error of law.
OFFENCES
SEXUAL-ASSAULT CONSENT: 
In R. v. Gagnon, Warrant Officer J. Gagnon was charged with
the offence of sexual assault, an offence punishable under sec-
tion 130 of the National Defence Act.5 He was acquitted by a
court-martial panel. The Crown appealed to the Court Martial
Appeal Court of Canada, arguing that the Military Trial Judge
erred in placing the defence of honest belief in consent before
the panel. The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The appeal was dismissed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court stated: “[T]here was no evidence from which a
trier of fact could find that the appellant had taken reasonable
steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting. . . . It
follows that the defence of honest but mistaken belief should
not have been put to the panel.”
PROCEDURE
CROWN DISCLOSURE:
In R. v. Gubbins and Vallentgoed, two accused were each
charged with the offence of operating a motor vehicle with a
blood-alcohol level exceeding .08, contrary to section
253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. In each case, the essential evi-
dence against them was the results of the analysis of their
breath conducted on breathalyzer machines.6
Before their trials, both of the accused requested that the
Crown disclose to them the maintenance records for the
breathalyzer machines used to analyze their breath samples.
The Crown refused to provide the requested disclosure. 
Mr. Vallentgoed’s application was dismissed and he was sub-
sequently convicted at trial. Mr. Gubbins was granted a stay of
proceedings on the basis of the Crown’s failure to disclose the
records. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal considered both matters on
appeal. A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Val-
lentgoed’s conviction. It set aside the stay entered in relation to
Mr. Gubbins and remitted his matter for a new trial.
THE APPEAL:
Appeals were taken to the Supreme Court of Canada by
both accused. The Supreme Court described the issues raised
by the appeals in the following manner:
These appeals deal with the scope of the Crown’s dis-
closure obligations with respect to maintenance records
of breathalyzer instruments. . . . Are the maintenance
records part of first party disclosure, subject to inclusion
in the Crown’s standard disclosure package? Or, are
these records third party records, which require the
defence to demonstrate their likely relevance before an
order for disclosure can be made?
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA:
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed both appeals. It
held that these “records are subject to third party (rather than
first party) disclosure. On the evidence in both cases, the
defence failed to show that the maintenance records meet the
requisite threshold for third party disclosure.” 
The Supreme Court noted that it has held that held that “the
Crown has a duty to disclose all relevant, non-privileged infor-
mation in its possession or control, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory. This is referred to as first party disclosure.” How-
ever, the “Crown” for the purposes of disclosure “does not refer
to all Crown entities, but only to the prosecuting Crown . . . . All
other Crown entities, including police, are third parties for the
purposes of disclosure.” For third-party disclosure to occur, an
accused person must “show that the record is ‘likely relevant.’”
The Supreme Court held that to determine if a record is sub-
ject to first- or third-party disclosure, the following factors
should be considered: 
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(1) Is the information that is sought in the possession
or control of the prosecuting Crown? and (2) Is the
nature of the information sought such that the police or
another Crown entity in possession or control of the
information ought to have supplied it to the prosecuting
Crown?
The Supreme Court concluded that the maintenance
records are not part of first-party disclosure because they “are
not in the possession or control of the prosecuting Crown.
They do not form part of the ‘fruits of the investigation’; and
the evidence in this case is that the maintenance records are
not ‘obviously relevant’ to the cases of the accused . . . .”
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE:
The Supreme Court held that neither accused had proven
that the maintenance records were “likely relevant” as to
whether “an instrument was malfunctioning or operated
improperly [and i]n the absence of any such evidence, the
expert evidence of the Crown is persuasive that the mainte-
nance records are not relevant. By its nature, this is a technical
and scientific question, not a matter of doctrine.” 
CERTIORARI:
In R. v. Awashish, a companion case to Gubbins, the accused
was also charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-
alcohol level exceeding .08, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of
the Criminal Code.7 Before her trial, she applied for an order
requiring the Crown to “inquire” into the existence of mainte-
nance records for the breathalyzer machine used to analyze her
breath. The application was granted by a provincial-court
judge.
The Crown successfully obtained an order of certiorari to
quash the order. The accused appealed to the Quebec Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that
certiorari was not available because the trial judge’s decision
was made within the exercise of her jurisdiction as the trial
judge. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court indicated
that resort to certiorari is “tightly limited by the Criminal Code
and the common law so as to ensure that it is not used to do
an ‘end-run’ around the rule against interlocutory appeals.”
The Court held that 
certiorari in criminal proceedings is available to parties
only for a jurisdictional error by a provincial court judge.
. . . For third parties, certiorari is available to review
jurisdictional errors as well as errors on the face of the
record relating to a decision of a final and conclusive
character vis-à-vis the third party . . . .
The Supreme Court held that the order of certiorari should
not have been issued because the decision of the trial judge did
not involve a jurisdictional error. However, the Supreme Court
concluded that “Ms. Awashish did not establish a basis for the
records’ existence or relevance. The Crown was therefore
under no obligation to inquire into the matter.” The trial judge
“erred in holding otherwise. However, given that she made no
jurisdictional error, certiorari cannot be used to correct that
error.”
INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS OF PUBLICATION
BANS:
In R. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the accused was
charged with the first-degree murder of a person under the age
of eighteen.8 At the trial, a publication ban was issued pro-
hibiting the publication, broadcast, or transmission in any way
of any information that could identify the victim, pursuant to
section 486.4(2.2) of the Criminal Code.
Before the issuance of the publication ban, the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) had posted information on
its website, which revealed the identity of the victim. After the
publication ban was issued, the CBC refused to remove the
information.
The Crown sought the issuing of a mandatory interlocutory
injunction directing the removal of the victim’s identifying
information from the website. 
The application judge dismissed the application, conclud-
ing that the Crown had not established the requirements for an
interlocutory injunction. The Crown appealed. A majority of
the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the
injunction. 
The CBC appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
appeal was allowed and the injunction was set aside. The
Supreme Court indicated that an application for a mandatory
interlocutory injunction must satisfy three elements: 
At the first stage, the application judge is to under-
take a preliminary investigation of the merits to decide
whether the applicant demonstrates a “serious question
to be tried” . . . . The applicant must then, at the second
stage, convince the court that it will suffer irreparable
harm if an injunction is refused. Finally, the third stage
of the test requires an assessment of the balance of con-
venience, in order to identify the party which would suf-
fer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the inter-
locutory injunction. . . .
The Supreme Court also indicated that this constituted a
“general framework” and that there are cases “which require ‘an
extensive review of the merits’ at the first stage of the analysis.”
The Supreme Court held that an application for a manda-
tory interlocutory injunction, the appropriate criterion for
assessing the strength of the applicant’s case at the first stage
“is not whether there is a serious issue to be tried, but rather
whether the applicant has shown a strong prima facie case”:
A mandatory injunction directs the defendant to
undertake a positive course of action, such as taking
steps to restore the status quo, or to otherwise “put the
situation back to what it should be”. . . . 
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The Supreme Court concluded that “the chambers judge
applied the correct legal test in deciding the Crown’s applica-
tion, and his decision that the Crown’s case failed to satisfy that
test did not, in these circumstances, warrant appellate inter-
vention.” 
WHEN A WITNESS REFUSES TO ANSWER:
In R. v. Noremore, the accused was charged with the offence
of attempted murder.9 At his trial, a witness refused to answer
a question asked by defence counsel. The trial judge reminded
the witness of the potential consequences of failing to answer,
but the witness continued to refuse to answer, and the trial
judge did not cite the witness for contempt.
The accused was convicted and appealed. A majority of the
Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador overturned
the conviction, concluding that the trial judge’s failure to cite
the witness for contempt caused the trial to be unfair.
The Crown appealed, as of right, to the Supreme Court of
Canada, which allowed the appeal and restored the conviction.
In an oral judgment the Supreme Court held that “the trial
judge did not err in the way in which he addressed a witness’s
refusal to answer a question put to him by defence counsel”:
The question the witness refused to answer was put to
him by defence counsel in an attempt to raise doubts
about who wrote two notes found in Mr. Normore’s res-
idence. The trial judge relied on these notes, along with
other evidence, to find that Mr. Normore had committed
the offences in question. However, in all of the circum-
stances of this case, including that Mr. Normore subse-
quently admitted to writing the most incriminating
statement in these notes, we are of the view that the trial
judge’s failure to take further steps to compel the witness
to answer the question put to him could not have had an
effect on the verdict. 
TRIAL JUDGE’S REASONS—SUFFICIENCY:
In R. v. Black, the accused was convicted of the offence of
importing cocaine into Canada.10 He appealed from convic-
tion, arguing that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient. A
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Pardu J.A., dissent-
ing) dismissed the appeal. The accused appealed, as of right, to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
In a brief judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed
the appeal, stating:
We agree with Justice Pardu that the trial judge’s rea-
sons, even when read as a whole and in the context of
the trial record, fail to reveal the basis on which the trial
judge concluded that the Crown had proven the mental
element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. The
reasons fail to fulfil the function of permitting effective
appellate review.
The appeal is therefore allowed, and a new trial is
ordered.11
TRIAL JUDGE’S REASONS-STEREOTYPICAL THINKING:
In R. v. A.R.J.D., the accused was charged with three counts
of sexual assault.12 He was acquitted. The Crown’s appeal to
the Alberta Court of Appeal was successful, and a new trial was
ordered. 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court considered the appeal on the issue of whether
the trial judge’s reasons illustrated the use of stereotypical
thinking in rejecting the complainant’s evidence.
The appeal was dismissed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court of Canada issued the following judgment: 
In considering the lack of evidence of the com-
plainant’s avoidance of the appellant, the trial judge
committed the very error he had earlier in his reasons
instructed himself against: he judged the complainant’s
credibility based solely on the correspondence between
her behaviour and the expected behaviour of the stereo-
typical victim of sexual assault. This constituted an error
of law.13
THE WITHDRAWAL OF A GUILTY PLEA:
In R. v. Wong, the accused pleaded guilty to the offence of
trafficking in cocaine and was sentenced to nine months of
imprisonment.14 Because of the accused’s status as a “perma-
nent resident of Canada,” the sentence had the consequence of
a loss of his permanent-resident status and a removal order
from Canada being issued without any right of appeal being
allowed. 
The accused appealed from conviction, seeking to withdraw
his guilty plea. He filed an affidavit indicating that before
entering his plea of guilty, he had been unaware of the possible
immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
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cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence or an act or
omission in connection with
(i) anything mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iii) or (iv),
or 
(ii) the appointment of any person, including them-
selves, to an office . . . .
In R. v. Carson, the accused was charged with the offence
“influence peddling,” contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the
Criminal Code.15
The accused had used government contacts to help a com-
pany, H2O Professionals Inc. (H20), sell water treatment sys-
tems to First Nation’s Communities. In exchange, H2O
promised to pay a commission to the accused’s girlfriend. After
the agreement was made, the accused spoke to government
officials at Indian and Northern Affairs Canada to promote the
purchase of H2O’s products. 
The trial judge entered an acquittal, having concluded that
it was the communities rather than the government that
decided whether to purchase the water systems. The Ontario
Court of Appeal allowed a Crown appeal and substituted a
conviction. 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court indicated that “[t]he sole issue in this appeal is
whether the assistance he promised to provide was in connec-
tion with ‘any matter of business relating to the government.’”
The Court found that the accused “admitted to having influ-
ence with the government. He also admitted that he demanded
a benefit for another person as consideration for assisting H2O
by calling upon his government contacts to promote the sale of
its water treatment systems to First Nations.”
The appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed. The
Supreme Court of Canada held that an offence under section
121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code “requires that the promised
influence be in fact connected to a matter of business that
relates to government” and “a matter of business relates to the
government if it depends on or could be facilitated by the gov-
ernment, given its mandate.”  
The Supreme Court described the elements of an offence
under section 121(1)(d) as being the following:
1. having or pretending to have influence with the gov-
ernment, a minister, or an official;
2. directly or indirectly demanding, accepting, or offer-
ing or agreeing to accept a reward, advantage or ben-
efit of any kind for oneself or another person;
3. as consideration for the cooperation, assistance, exer-
cise of influence, or an act or omission;
4. in connection with a transaction of business with or
any matter of business relating to the government.
The accused was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada. 
The Supreme Court described the issue raised by the appeal
in the following manner:
This case concerns the proper approach for consider-
ing whether a guilty plea can be withdrawn on the basis
that the accused was unaware of a collateral conse-
quence stemming from that plea, such that holding him
or her to the plea amounts to a miscarriage of justice
under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code . . . .
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court indicated
that an accused person “need not show a viable defence to the
charge to withdraw a plea on procedural grounds.” The Court
held that in order to withdrawal a guilty plea the accused must
demonstrate “prejudice”:
In our view, an accused seeking to withdraw a guilty
plea must demonstrate prejudice by filing an affidavit
establishing a reasonable possibility that he or she would
have either (1) pleaded differently, or (2) pleaded guilty,
but with different conditions. . . .
A guilty plea on different conditions will suffice to
establish prejudice where a court finds that the accused
would have insisted on those conditions to enter a guilty
plea and where those conditions would have alleviated,
in whole or in part, the adverse effects of the legally rel-
evant consequence. . . . 
The Supreme Court also held that to be granted leave to
withdraw a guilty plea an accused person must “articulate a
meaningfully different course of action to justify vacating a
plea, and satisfy a court that there is a reasonable possibility he
or she would have taken that course.”
CONCLUSION—WONG:
The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal should be
dismissed because though the accused 
filed an affidavit before the Court of Appeal, he did not
depose to what he would have done differently in the
plea process had he been informed of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea . . . .
OFFENCES
INFLUENCE PEDDLING:
Section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code creates the offence
of “influence peddling,” which is defined as:
having or pretending to have influence with the govern-
ment or with a minister of the government or an official,
directly or indirectly demands, accepts or offers or agrees
to accept, for themselves or another person, a reward,
advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for
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The Supreme Court also held, at paragraph 24, that the
phrase “any matter of business relating to the government”
must be “interpreted broadly. A matter of business relates to
the government if it depends on government action or could be
facilitated by government, given its mandate. Thus, s.
121(1)(d) captures promises to exercise influence to change or
expand government programs.” 
The Court indicated that section 121(1)(d) 
criminalizes the selling of influence in connection with
any matter of business relating to the government. The
accused does not need to actually have influence with
the government, endeavour to exercise influence, or suc-
ceed in influencing government to be found guilty of this
offence. Indeed, the text of s. 121(1)(d) explicitly targets
everyone “having or pretending to have influence with
the government.” The offence is complete once the
accused demands a benefit in exchange for a promise to
exercise influence in connection with a matter of busi-
ness that relates to government.
The Supreme Court concluded that the accused’s 
promised assistance was in connection with a matter of
business relating to the government. . . . By demanding
a benefit in exchange for his promise to exercise his
influence with the government to H2O’s advantage, Mr.
Carson undermined the appearance of government
integrity. This is exactly the type of conduct s. 121(1)
(d)(i) is intended to prohibit. 
FIRST-DEGREE MURDER DURING A FORCIBLE CON-
FINEMENT:
Section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code indicates that if the
death of a person is caused during the commission of the
offence of forcible confinement, the murder is first-degree
murder:
Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and
deliberate on the part of any person, murder is first
degree murder in respect of a person when the death is
caused by that person while committing or attempting to
commit [either kidnapping or forcible confinement].
In R. v. Magoon, the accused were charged with the offence
of first-degree murder and convicted of the offence of second-
degree murder.16 The offence involved the killing of a young
child (Meika) by the child’s father and step-mother. The trial
judge had acquitted the accused of first-degree murder on the
basis that they had not forcibly confined Meika while inflicting
the blows that killed her.
The accused appealed from the second-degree murder con-
viction, and the Crown appealed from the acquittal on the
charge of first-degree murder.
The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal
and entered a conviction for first-degree murder. The accused
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The appeal was dis-
missed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal
did not err in finding the accused guilty of first-degree murder.
It held that the five elements of the offence as set out in the
section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, including a forcible
confinement, had been established at the trial.
The Supreme Court indicated, at paragraph 61, that pur-
suant to section 231(5) of the Criminal Code, “second degree
murder becomes first degree murder where the accused com-
mits the murder in conjunction with one of the other offences
listed in that section, such as sexual assault or kidnapping. All
of the offences listed in s. 231(5) involve unlawful domina-
tion.”  
The Supreme Court referred to its decision in R. v. Harbot-
tle, and indicated that “for an accused to be convicted of first
degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code the Crown
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that”: 
(1) the accused was guilty of the underlying crime of
domination or of attempting to commit that crime; (2)
the accused was guilty of the murder of the victim; (3)
the accused participated in the murder in such a manner
that he was a substantial cause of the death of the victim;
(4) there was no intervening act of another which
resulted in the accused no longer being substantially
connected to the death of the victim; and (5) the crimes
of domination and murder were part of the same trans-
action.
The Supreme Court indicated that at “issue in this case are
the first and fifth Harbottle elements: Was Meika unlawfully
confined, and were the unlawful confinement and murder part
of the same transaction? We begin with the first element—
unlawful confinement.
FORCIBLE CONFINEMENT:
Section 279(2) of the Criminal Code states:
(2) Every one who, without lawful authority, confines,
imprisons or forcibly seizes another person is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding ten years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary convic-
tion and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding eighteen months.
The Supreme Court of Canada held, at paragraph 64, that
pursuant to section 279(2) of the Criminal Code, the Crown
must show that: 
(1) the accused confined the victim, and (2) the confine-
ment was unlawful. . . . [U]nlawful confinement occurs if
17. R. v. Stephan, 2018 SCC 21, [2018] 423 D.L.R. 52 (Can.). 
18. In his dissenting reasons in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Justice
O’Ferrall held that the trial judge had failed to properly instruct
the jury “with respect to: (1) what a failure would have consisted
of for the purpose of the second element of the actus reus, and (2)
the evidence it should have considered in assessing whether there
had been a failure” and “erred in law in articulating the second
element of the actus reus of the offence of failing to provide the
necessaries of life.” [2017] ABCA 380 (Can. Alta. C.A.). 
19. R. v. Seipp, 2018 SCC 1, [2018] 362 C.C.C. 2 (Can.). 
20. R. v. G.T.D., 2018 SCC 7, [2018] 359 C.C.C. 340 (Can.).
“for any significant period of time [the victim] was coer-
cively restrained or directed contrary to her wishes, so
that she could not move about according to her own
inclination and desire” . . . . The “restriction need not be
to a particular place or involve total physical restraint.” 
. . . Restraint of the victim through physical acts of vio-
lence is sufficient but not necessary to establish unlawful
confinement. Confinement can be effected “by fear,
intimidation and psychological and other means.”
Regarding children, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated
that “a finding of confinement does not require evidence of a
child being physically bound or locked up; it can just as easily
result from evidence of controlling conduct.” 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that there was “no
doubt that Meika was confined on Sunday. She was coercively
restrained and directed contrary to her wishes. And the con-
finement was clearly unlawful. The acts of ‘discipline’ were
grossly disproportionate, cruel, degrading, deliberately harm-
ful, and far exceeded any acceptable form of parenting.” 
PART OF THE SAME TRANSACTION?
The Supreme Court concluded that “the unlawful confine-
ment and murder were part of the same transaction”: 
The course of unlawful confinement leading up to
Meika’s death was . . . the “continuing illegal domina-
tion” of Meika, representing an “exploitation of the posi-
tion of power created by the underlying crime.” . . . And
the unlawful confinement persisted right up to the
moment Meika lost consciousness.
CONCLUSION—MAGOON:
The Supreme Court concluded “that Ms. Magoon and Mr.
Jordan unlawfully confined Meika, and the unlawful confine-
ment and murder were two distinct criminal acts that formed
part of a single transaction. The Court of Appeal of Alberta did
not err in substituting verdicts of guilty for first degree murder.”
FAILING TO PROVIDE THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE:
Section 215 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence for a
parent to fail to provide “the necessaries of life” to a “person
under [their] charge.” 
In R. v. Stephan, the accused were convicted of the offence
of failing to provide the necessities of life to their child.17 Their
one-year-old son died when the accused parents did not take
him to a doctor but chose to treat him with homeopathic reme-
dies. The parents were charged and convicted with failing to
provide the necessities of life. 
An appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal by the accused
was dismissed (Justice O’Ferrall dissenting). The accused
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In a brief oral judg-
ment, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, stating: “[T]he
learned trial judge conflated the actus reus and mens rea of the
offence and did not sufficiently explain the concept of marked
departure in a way that the jury could understand and apply it.
Accordingly, we . . . quash the conviction and order a new
trial.”18
FAILING TO REMAIN AT THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT:
In R. v. Seipp, the accused was convicted of the offence of
failing to stop at the scene of an accident, contrary to section
252(1) of the Criminal Code.19 His appeal to the British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal was dismissed. 
He appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. That appeal
was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Canada considered the
appeal on the issue of whether the necessary intent had been
proven at the trial. In a brief oral judgment, the Court stated:
The evidence on which Mr. Seipp relies is that he fled
the scene to avoid criminal liability for possession of a
stolen vehicle. This is not evidence to the contrary.
Rather, it is evidence that Mr. Seipp intended to avoid
criminal or civil liability from his care, charge, or control
of the vehicle involved in the accident. Such an intent
falls within the ambit of the mens rea established by the
expression “intent to escape civil or criminal liability” in
s. 252(1). 
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
SECTIONS 10(B) AND 24(2):
Section 10(b) of the Charter guarantees every arrested or
detained person in Canada the right to contact counsel “with-
out delay.” Section 24(2) of the Charter allows a trial judge to
exclude evidence if the evidence was obtained in violation of
the Charter.
In R. v. G.T.D., the accused was convicted of the offence of
sexual assault.20 His appeal to the Court of Appeal of Alberta
was dismissed. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada
on the issue of whether evidence led at the trial should have
been excluded based upon his right to contact counsel having
been infringed.
The appeal was allowed. In a brief oral judgment, the
Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the accused’s right to
contact counsel was infringed and that the evidence obtained
should be excluded: 
The right to counsel under s. 10 (b) of the Charter
obliges police to “‘hold off’ from attempting to elicit
incriminatory evidence from the detainee until he or she
has had a reasonable opportunity to reach counsel” (R. v.
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21. In R. v. Ippak, 2018 NUCA 3, [2018] Nu. J. No. 18, it was sug-
gested that G.T.D. stands for the proposition that proof of “a sys-
temic and institutional pattern of Charter violations by a police
service” will make the breach more likely to result in exclusion of
evidence:
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v GTD,
2018 SCC 7, allowing the accused’s appeal on the basis of the
dissenting reasons of Veldhuis JA of this Court in R. v GTD,
2017 ABCA 274 [GTD], reiterates the seriousness of breaches
where the evidence lead at trial establishes a systemic and insti-
tutional pattern of Charter violations by a police service. That
matter concerned s 10(b) breaches by police whose standard
caution card asked all arrestees whether they wished to say
anything about the offence being charged after the arrestee was
advised and asserted his or her right to counsel, triggering the
state’s obligation to hold-off eliciting evidence.
22. R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 363 C.C.C. 1 (Can.). 
Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at p. 269). The first issue
in this appeal is whether the question “Do you wish to
say anything?,” asked at the conclusion of the standard
caution . . . after G.T.D. had already invoked his right to
counsel, violated this duty to “hold off.” We are all of the
view that it did, because it elicited a statement from
G.T.D. 21
SENTENCING
Refusing to Comply with a Breathalyzer Demand After
Causing an Accident Resulting in Death and the Effect of “Col-
lateral Consequences” and Mistake of Law on Sentencing:
In R. v. Suter, the accused drove his vehicle onto a restaurant
patio, killing a young child. The circumstances were described
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the following manner:
While the vehicle was stopped in that space, Mrs.
Suter turned to her husband and exclaimed “Maybe we
should just get a divorce.” At about the same moment,
she realized that the vehicle was inching forward, and she
yelled at her husband to stop. Unfortunately, Mr. Suter’s
foot had come off the brake pedal and instead of hitting
the brake, he pressed down on the gas pedal. The vehicle
accelerated through the glass partition and within a sec-
ond or two, it slammed into the restaurant wall.22
After the collision, the accused was pulled from his vehicle
and beaten by people at the scene. Subsequently, he was
abducted by a group of vigilantes who used a set of pruning
shears to cut off his thumb.
When the accused was arrested, the police made a demand
for samples of his breath to be provided for alcohol content
analysis. He spoke to counsel and refused to comply with the
demand. He subsequently was charged with and pleaded guilty
to the offence of refusing to provide a breath sample knowing
that he caused an accident resulting in a death, contrary to sec-
tion 255(3.2) of the Criminal Code. An expert report filed at
the sentence hearing indicated that the accused “would not
have blown ‘over 80’ [the lawful limit in Canada] had he pro-
vided the police with a breath sample.” The sentencing judge
described the offence as an “accident caused by a non-impaired
driving error.”
The sentencing judge imposed a period of four months of
imprisonment and a thirty-month driving prohibition. The
Crown appealed. 
The Court of Appeal of Alberta allowed the Crown’s appeal
and increased the period of imprisonment imposed to a period
of twenty-six months. The accused was granted leave to appeal
by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court concluded that
the four-month period of imprisonment imposed by the sen-
tencing judge was “manifestly inadequate.” However, it also
held that the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal was
excessive. The Supreme Court reduced that sentence imposed
to time served (approximately ten-and-one-half months), but
upheld the driving prohibition.
The Supreme Court held that the Alberta Court of Appeal 
improperly recast the accident as one caused by health
and alcohol problems, anger, and distraction. It
reweighed the evidence and looked to external factors
that had no bearing on the gravity of the offence for
which Mr. Suter was charged, nor on Mr. Suter’s level of
moral blameworthiness. In doing so, the court effectively
punished Mr. Suter for a careless driving or dangerous
driving causing death offence for which he was neither
tried nor convicted. This was an error in principle that 
. . . resulted in the imposition of an unfit sentence. 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES:
The Supreme Court indicated that there “is no rigid formula
for taking collateral consequences into account. They may flow
from the length of sentence, or from the conviction itself.” The
Supreme Court described a collateral consequence as “any con-
sequence arising from the commission of an offence, the con-
viction for an offence, or the sentence imposed for an offence,
that impacts the offender.” The Supreme Court concluded that
the sentencing judge “correctly” considered “the vigilante vio-
lence experienced by Mr. Suter could be considered—to a lim-
ited extent—when crafting an appropriate sentence.” 
The Supreme Court held that collateral consequences “can-
not be used to reduce a sentence to a point where the sentence
becomes disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the
moral blameworthiness of the offender.” 
MISTAKE OF LAW:
The Supreme Court indicated that though a mistake of law 
is not a defence to a criminal charge . . . mistake of law can
nevertheless be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing .
. . . This is because offenders who honestly but mistakenly
believe in the lawfulness of their actions are less morally
blameworthy than offenders who—in committing the
same offence—are unsure about the lawfulness of their
actions, or know that their actions are unlawful.
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REFUSAL CHARGES AND LACK OF IMPAIRMENT:
The Supreme Court held that although “a finding of non-
impairment is a relevant mitigating factor when sentencing an
offender for a refusal offence, its mitigating effect must be lim-
ited.” The Court indicated that “the seriousness of the offence
and the moral blameworthiness of the offender stem primarily
from the refusal itself, and not from the offender’s level of
impairment.” 
AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE:
The Supreme Court indicated that “the sentencing range for
the s. 255(3.2) offence is the same as for impaired driving
causing death and driving ‘over 80’ causing death—low peni-
tentiary sentences of 2 or 3 years to more substantial peniten-
tiary sentences of 8 to 10 years, depending on the circum-
stances.” 
After referring to the “attenuating circumstances” present,
the Supreme Court concluded that a period of “15 to 18
months’ imprisonment” would have been an appropriate sen-
tence “while not losing sight of the gravity of the [offense]: 
But for these attenuating circumstances, I am of the
view that a sentence of three to five years in the peni-
tentiary would not have been out of line. 
Unlawfully refusing to provide the police with a
breath sample after having caused an accident resulting
in a death is an extremely serious offence. . . . It carries
with it a maximum punishment of life imprisonment—
and with good cause. When a person refuses to provide
a breath sample in response to a lawful request, this
deprives the police, the court, the public at large, and the
family of the deceased of the best evidence as to the dri-
ver’s blood alcohol level and state of impairment. More-
over, it places a barrier in the way of the ongoing efforts
and pressing objective of deterring, denouncing, and
putting an end to the scourge of impaired driving. 
CONCLUSION—SUTER:
Though the Supreme Court concluded that a fit sentence at
the time of sentencing would have been one of fifteen to eigh-
teen months of imprisonment, it imposed a sentence of time
served because the accused 
spent almost nine months awaiting this Court’s decision
. . . to now impose on Mr. Suter what would have been a
fit disposition at the time he was sentenced would cause
him undue hardship, and serve no useful purpose. In
short, it would not be in the interests of justice to rein-
carcerate Mr. Suter at this time.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada has consid-
ered a number of important issues in the criminal law context
in 2018, including issues of evidence, procedure, and sentenc-
ing.
Interestingly, we have also seen the Supreme Court issue
brief oral judgments in cases which appeared to raise impor-
tant questions of law. These brief judgments can be tantaliz-
ingly difficult to apply. It is particularly interesting that these
judgments are primarily rendered in appeals that have come
before the Supreme Court as of right.
Finally, which of these judgments will have the greatest
long-term impact? I would choose the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Gubbins because the Court’s decision in this case settles
a long-standing disclosure issue in Canada. As the Supreme
Court noted in Gubbins: “Canadian courts have differed as to
which disclosure regime applies to breathalyzer maintenance
records.” Now, this issue is settled.
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. 
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We are accepting applications to join our editing team. Our plan is generally to have
each of the Court Review editors take responsibility for one issue per year, while also
participating in quarterly conference calls and helping to coordinate content. We
hope to add one or two additional judges to our team. This is a great way to stay on
top of issues of interest to judges and to help shape the information flow going to
other judges throughout the United States and Canada.
Please send your expression of interest to Editors@courtreview.org. If you have a CV
or resume, please enclose it—and let us know of any experience you have in writing
and editing.
WANTED:
A JUDGE WHO WOULD LIKE TO JOIN THE TEAM OF EDITORS 
FOR COURT REVIEW, THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE 
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION
The American Judges Association (AJA) conducted interviews about procedural 
fairness with nine national leaders on issues involving judges and the courts. The 
interviews, done by Kansas Court of Appeals Judge and past AJA president Steve
Leben, cover the elements of procedural fairness for courts and judges, how judges
can improve fairness skills, and how the public reacts to courts and judges. The
interviews were done in August 2014; job titles are shown as of the date of the 
interviews.
Visit http://proceduralfairnessguide.org/interviews/ to watch the interviews.
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION:
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS INTERVIEWS
Across
1 Took to the airport, e.g.
7 Bergman collaborator Nykvist
11 Berets and bonnets
15 Like some music
16 Champagne pop?
17 Ambler or Sevareid
18 Thing seen on a lab slide
19 Cozy country lodges
20 A.D. part
21 Area where a bordello might 
be found
24 Army div. officer
25 Frozen drink brand
26 Clark’s big role
27 Wearisome speaker
29 Common test answer
30 West of Tinseltown
31 Simile’s middle
32 Max, Buddy or Bugs
33 Forum participant
37 It’s typically non-violent and 
financially motivated
40 Hand-lotion ingredient
41 Defeat, barely
42 Movie star Ryan
43 Butter helping
44 Put together
45 Items in pocket protectors
46 Garlicky mayonnaise
49 Heroine of “Last Days of Pompeii”
50 Rapper ___ Wayne
51 Panel with highly qualified 
members
LIVING COLORS by Judge Victor Fleming
49 Construction element
50 Donizetti heroine
52 Troublesome tykes
53 Sails on sloops
54 Fox Sports rival
55 No great shakes
56 Threat to a misbehaving child
57 Chicken chow ___
58 Response to a doubter
59 ‘60s singer Sands
60 Florida tree
61 Muscle toned by curls
62 Fishing-rod attachment
63 Captain Hook aide
64 Refuses to comply
Down
1 Villain of “The Lion King”
2 Reflective sigh
3 Pattern seen in lumber
4 End of a threat
5 Male model Lanzoni
6 Patriotic symbol
7 Feature of Betty Boop’s hairdo
8 Buyer
9 “Sesame Street” Muppet
10 Loch ___
11 “I second that!”
12 Golfer Palmer, to his “army”
13 Touch of color
14 Lawyer-author Turow
22 Find employment
23 Channeler’s state
27 Loud shout
28 Fed. agency concerned with
worker safety
29 Understood without being said
30 Join together
32 Upscale L.A. section
33 Deject
34 Chronological listings
35 Augury
36 Rules of conduct, for short
38 Summit
39 1989 Morgan Freeman film
44 Kind of hotspot or router
45 Publisher’s headache
46 Lum’s partner
47 “___ little baby ducks” 
(Tom T. Hall lyric)
48 Type of navel
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 184.
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WEBSITES OF INTEREST
National Inventory of 
Collateral Consequences
of Conviction
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org 
As judges, we know that criminal sen-
tences carry consequences. The ones we
usually encounter are the direct ones—
the defendant must serve some amount
of time in prison, followed by parole or
postrelease supervision. But there are a
great many other consequences of a crim-
inal conviction. Judges, attorneys, and
members of the public who want to
understand the criminal-justice system
more fully will want to know about them
too.
There’s now a searchable online data-
base where you can find the collateral
consequences for convictions throughout
the United States. The project, years in
the making, launched in late 2018.
The project came in response to the
federal Court Security Improvement Act
of 2007, which told the National Institute
of Justice to collect and analyze the col-
lateral consequences of convictions in
each United States jurisdiction. In 2012,
the American Bar Association’s Criminal
Justice Section began work on collecting
the collateral consequences in all 50
states, the District of Columbia, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the fed-
eral criminal-justice system. 
The Council of State Governments
Justice Center took over the project in
2017 and launched the new National
Inventory of Collateral Consequences of
Conviction website in late 2018. The
website is part of the National Reentry
Resource Center (https://csgjusticecen
ter.org/nrrc), a project funded by the U.S.
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Assistance. 
A sample search on the database for
collateral consequences of convictions in
Kansas showed more than 500 results,
each with citation to the statute mandat-
ing that consequence. You can click an
additional button to add collateral federal
consequences.
According to the Council of State Gov-
ernments Justice Center, most of the col-
lateral consequences of conviction relate
to the ability to obtain employment. 
In addition to the searchable database,
the website also has links to reports about
collateral consequences of convictions,
model legislation in the area (like the
Uniform Collateral Consequences of
Conviction Act, proposed in 2010), and
several webinars available on demand.
One of those teaches how to use the
National Inventory of Collateral Conse-
quences of Conviction database effec-
tively. Others explore how technology
has influenced the process for clearing
criminal records and how barriers to
occupational licensing for people with
criminal records might be addressed. Pre-
sentation slides used in each of the webi-
nars can easily be downloaded.
d
NEW BOOKS
TOUGH CASES: JUDGES TELL THE STORIES OF
SOME OF THE HARDEST DECISIONS THEY’VE
EVER MADE (The New Press, 2018, Rus-
sell F. Canan, Gregory E. Mize & Freder-
ick H. Weisberg, eds.). $26.99 (280 pp.).
Judging can be a lonely calling. Some-
times there’s no one you can talk to about
the case that’s keeping you awake at night. 
But other judges have been there
before. And thirteen of them have writ-
ten the story of some of the toughest
cases they handled. They tell the stories
from a personal perspective, hoping to
give the public a glimpse behind the
curtain. For fellow judges, though, it’s a
chance to hear directly from an experi-
enced colleague about how a case you
didn’t seek changed the way you look at
other cases—or even your career or your
life.
In separate chapters, these judges have
told the personal story of a case or series
of cases they’ve handled. Some are famil-
iar stories from a new viewpoint: the case
to determine whether Terri Schiavo
should continue to be on life support,
and the trial of Scooter Libby, the chief of
staff to Vice President Dick Cheney. Oth-
ers were high-profile, though not nation-
ally: an elected judge throwing out a bal-
lot initiative approved by nearly a million
voters in Washington State; an appointed
judge who presided over the trial to the
court of a case in which a mother was
charged with murdering her four daugh-
ters, whose decomposed bodies were
found when eviction papers were served.
All of the stories are compelling.
Most of the stories are from experi-
enced judges. One, from Judge Michelle
Ahnn in Los Angeles, tells the story of
transition to the bench—going from reg-
ular cases of “decisional fatigue” in Year 1
to a better, compartmentalized experi-
ence in Year 2. 
Judges will find themselves in many of
the stories, but with the benefit of the
considered perspective of another judge.
Family members of a judge will get a bet-
ter sense of the issues and emotions that
are part of the job. And members of the
public will see inside a branch of govern-
ment in a way that’s rarely available.
We’re glad these judges took the time to
tell their stories.
The Resource Page
g
